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This report offers an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its emphasis is on deve-
lopments following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and addresses the pheno-
menon referred to as jihadism. This report, the first in a series, hopes to 
contribute to a greater understanding of Dutch policy in an international 
perspective. Subsequent reports will explore particular subareas in more 
detail, including person-specific measures regarding so-called Syria/Iraq 
travellers, and court cases against these individuals. This report offers back-
ground information by analysing how approaches dealing with jihadism, 
which involve counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures, are 
organised in the above-mentioned countries. This report examines policy 
plans and strategies, both at the declaratory level and, to a lesser extent, 
during implementation. In addition, this report looks into which actors are 
involved in dealing with jihadism. The primary focal point are policies at the 
national level with other levels of administration such as policies by local 
authorities featuring only indirectly.  
The report identifies three developments. Firstly, because plans and strate-
gies have been developed in all countries, it is possible to refer to counter-
terrorism and counter-radicalisation as policy domains. However, there are 
differences in each country. Germany has a counter-terrorism strategy, but it 
is not public; this also applied to the British counter-terrorism strategy until 
2006 and to the Belgian counter-radicalisation strategy until June 2016. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom explicitly use their policy documents 
to communicate with the public about policies and potential threats. Both 
countries have been developing plans for dealing with radicalisation since 
2005. Denmark followed in 2007 and the United States in 2009. France is a 
relative newcomer in this area, with its first serious initiatives in 2014. In all 
countries, the public visibility of the counter-terrorism and counter-radicali-
sation domain has increased enormously. At the same time, the many revi-
sions of plans show that the structure and content of policies dealing with 
jihadism is has no fixed form.  
The second development refers to the increased coordination of policy and 
initiatives for sharing information. This is related in particular to the idea 
12 
 
that counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation require a comprehensive 
approach. Although the traditional actors such as intelligence and security 
services, the police, and judicial authorities remain important, there are also 
new ones. These actors include socially-oriented institutions in the fields of 
education, welfare, and care, both governmental and non-governmental, as 
well as the commercial sector. This comprehensive approach is also evident 
in the different levels of administration involved in counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation: it is not exclusively a national issue; instead in each 
country local authorities are regarded as crucial for the success of national 
objectives. The policy domain links several administrative levels and types 
of activities (from early identification to criminal prosecution). This means 
that coordination and information-sharing (will) play an important role in 
conducting policy. The third development regards the demarcation of the 
policy domain. It does not have clear boundaries, in particular due to the 
inclusion of non-traditional security partners and non-governmental partners 
with regard to preventing radicalisation. 
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1  Introduction 
Concerns about the growth of and support for jihadism at home and abroad 
have increased since 2012.
1
 Initially these concerns focused on so-called 
foreign fighters who travelled to conflict zones in Syria. These concerns 
came to include persons returning from the battlefields in Syria/Iraq and 
persons who were stopped on their way as well as a growing number of 
(attempted) larger and smaller attacks. As a result, counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation have been high on the political agenda in the Nether-
lands. Since then existing policies have been intensified, new measures have 
been taken, and assessments have been made whether additional initiatives 
are necessary. 
For instance, in the Netherlands an Integrated Approach to Jihadism was 
presented in August 2014.
2
 In addition, a new Dutch counter-terrorism 
strategy was introduced in 2016, which focused on a flexible and sustainable 
approach to dealing with terrorism and extremism.
3
 The Dutch situation is 
not unique: other Western countries have also been confronted with jihad-
ism, and have taken or announced similar measures in recent years. 
The aim of this series of reports is to show how the Dutch response to 
jihadism compares internationally for the period of 2010-2016. This report 
offers an overview of policies in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). This 
report focuses on the period following the attacks on 11 September 2001, as 
this event led many countries to take extra measures against terrorism. It 
therefore covers a broader period than that stated above. 
The response to jihadism is embedded within other practices and includes 
counter-terrorism, which involves obtaining information about, the advance 
identification of, as well as the possible criminal prosecution of individuals 
considered to be a risk to the democratic legal order. This involves the 
intelligence and security services, police, and judicial authorities. The re-
sponse to jihadism also includes the prevention of radicalisation through 
                                                          
1 Special thanks to Amy Kasper in assisting with the translation and to Aimee Feeney for the final editing. 
2 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid and 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2014. 
3 Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 7. 
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socially-oriented, restrictive as well as criminal measures. This report invent-
tories what kind of measures are taken in terms of dealing with jihadism.  
This report shows the similarities and differences between the above-
mentioned countries and the Netherlands in how they deal with jihadism. 
The general context is largely the same, meaning that all these countries are 
confronted with jihadism. However, the degree to which this is the case 
differs, and the way in which these countries respond also varies. This is 
partly due to the political and legal culture of the countries and differences in 
their state structures. In order to analyse the similarities and differences in 
their policies dealing with jihadism, it is important to assess the context in 
which they have developed. 
The subject of this first report is how policies regarding jihadism are 
organised in the investigated countries. To this end, policy plans and strate-
gies were examined. Do these exist? Are they accessible to the general 
public? Is there an overarching vision for dealing with jihadism? Secondly, 
which actors are involved in policies dealing with jihadism? Are mainly 
national bodies involved, or are local authorities also included in crafting 
policy? Do non-governmental actors play a role?  
The report is structured as follows. First of all, the set-up of the study is 
delineated in greater detail. This is followed by two parts, whereby Part One 
examines the policy plans and strategies of each country. Part Two examines 
the actors involved in the policies, explained again for each country. Finally, 
the conclusion summarises the most salient similarities and differences 






2  Study design and methods 
This chapter explains the choices informing the design and methods inform-
ing this series of reports. 
2.1  Background information on this series of reports 
This study was made possible by funds from the National Coordinator for 
Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). Since 2012 there have been many 
developments with regard to dealing with jihadism. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the aim of this report is to contribute to a greater understanding 
of Dutch policy in an international perspective. This report is the first in a 
series, and which provides an overview of counter-terrorism policy and the 
prevention of radicalisation in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the 
UK, the US, and the Netherlands.  
Subsequent reports will be thematic. One report inventories measures taken 
against (potential) Syria/Iraq travellers and returnees, and another report 
maps court cases against these individuals. These reports seek to increase 
knowledge about dealing with jihadism by inventorying and comparing the 
laws and policies of the Netherlands with that of six other Western countries. 
2.2  Framework of analysis 
An overall framework is used to make a comparison possible between coun-
tries. Although this framework particularly applies to the subsequent reports, 
we will briefly explain it here. This framework consists of the fivefold 
distinction between different types of government intervention that are men-
tioned in the Dutch counter-terrorism strategy: acquire, prevent, defend, pre-
pare, and prosecute. 
The decision to use this framework is twofold. Firstly, the aim of this series 
of reports, as mentioned above, is to explain to Dutch policymakers how 
Dutch policy relates to that of several other European countries and the US. 
The fivefold distinction is an obvious choice, as they represent the overall 
vision for the Dutch approach to counter-terrorism and the prevention of 
radicalisation. Secondly, classifying the other countries according to the five 





2.3  Terminology 
A number of terms in this report must be explained in greater detail. To 
begin with the term policy domain. The introduction referred to counter-
terrorism and counter-radicalisation as a policy domain. This term suggests a 
field with a clearly demarcated set of problems and actors, but this is not the 
case. Reality is much more complex. In this report, the term policy domain 
refers to efforts dealing with jihadism which includes both counter-terrorism 
as well as counter-radicalisation. The boundaries of this domain vary over 
time and differ from country to country, as do the number and type of actors 
that are active in this policy domain.  
Another term that needs explanation is jihadism. This is the most common 
term in Dutch discourse to refer to what is considered in the National 
Counter-terrorism Strategy 2016-2020 as ‘the most important threat (…) for 
our national security’.
4
 With the term jihadism the NCTV refers to “an 
extreme political ideology which aims to meet the divine obligation to 
spread Islam all over the world. This is to be achieved by a ‘holy war’ 
against all unbelievers: In the eyes of Jihadists, anything that deviates from 
the ‘pure doctrine’ has to be fought with violence”.
5
 This ‘holy war’ is also 
called the lesser jihad, the armed struggle to defend Islam. In this report the 
term ‘jihadism’ does not refer to the basic meaning in the Quran, the greater 




Since 2004 the term ‘jihadism’ has been commonly used in Dutch policy 
documents; before 2004 the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ was used, and until 
2001 the term ‘radical Islamic groups’ appeared regularly.
7
 For the term 
foreign fighter and returnee variations have been used, which are still com-
mon, such as ‘jihad-goers’, ‘jihad fighters’, ‘Syria travellers’, and ‘foreign 
fighters’.
8
 This search for the most suitable terminology reflects attempts to 
define the problem. The terminology also varies internationally, as is shown 
                                                          
4 Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 6. 
5 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016. 
6 Berger 2006, p. 203. 
7 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2005; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 2002. 
8 See Bakker and De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2015, p. 21. 
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in Table 1. For reasons of clarity, in this report the terms Syria/Iraq travellers 
and returnees are used. 
Table 1: Recent names for Syria/Iraq travellers in the selected countries 
(2014-2016) 
Country Term 
Belgium ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighters’, ‘Syriëstrijders’9 
Denmark ‘truslen fra personer udrejst til Syrien og Irak’, ‘udrejsende’10 
Germany ‘Ausgereisten’, ‘Rückkehrer’11 
France ‘les filières syro-irakiennes’12 
United Kingdom ‘Foreign fighters’13 
United States ‘Foreign (terrorist) fighters’14 
 
2.4  The national context 
jihadism is an international phenomenon. In several international fora 
countries collaborate in dealing with jihadism. These include the United 
Nations (UN), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum and the Counter Terrorism Group, the latter being 
part of the so-called Club de Berne, an informal annual meeting of mainly 
European security services. Without downplaying the role of these inter-
national fora, the focus of this report is with the national level as policy is 
mainly implemented in this context. Within the national context, regional 
and/or local initiatives are also examined, although the main focus remains 
the national level. 
                                                          
9 FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2016; Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en minister van Justitie; Vlaamse 
regering 2015. 
10 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2014. 
11 Bundesministerium des Innern 2016a. 
12 Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2015; Premier Ministre 2016. 
13 HM Government 2016. 
14 U.S. Department of State 2016a. 
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2.5  Selection of countries 
This study focuses on seven countries. Besides the Netherlands it includes 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK, and the US. The choice of 
these countries is informed by the following considerations: they are 
neighbouring countries to the Netherlands (Belgium and Germany); the 
country has a pioneering role in dealing with jihadism (UK); they have a 
different approach (Denmark and France); or there is little knowledge about 
their policies regarding jihadism (US). 
2.6  Time period 
Although the overall series of reports focuses on policy developments be-
tween 2010 and 2016, the current report covers a broader period since it is a 
background study. The country studies in this report briefly detail events 
before 2001 but the emphasis is on developments after 2001. 
2.7  Sources and methods 
This report primarily examines declarative policy: policy that is included in 
action plans and strategies. To a lesser extent it examines actual policy im-
plementation. The initial step of the research involved the mapping of docu-
ments that set out the approach to counter-terrorism or how to deal with 
radicalisation, extremism or jihadism. This initial broad scope was neces-
sary, because dealing with jihadism is not a distinct activity but part of 
counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. This report has 
limited itself to outlining the main features of the policy rather than a 
detailed inquiry. Relevant academic literature was used to interpret develop-









3  The Netherlands 
3.1  The emergence of counter-terrorism as a policy domain 
The Netherlands has been developing a response to terrorism since the 
1970s. The immediate occasion were several hostage-takings and two train 
hijackings by Moluccan groups, resulting in several deaths. After this the 
Domestic Security Service (BVD), which was mainly occupied with coun-
tering communist influences, expanded its focus to include terrorism. An 
Official Steering Group Terrorist Actions (ASTA) was set up to coordinate 
the actions of the police, judicial authorities, and the BVD. The Dutch stra-
tegy towards terrorism was also known as the Dutch Approach: attempts to 
enter into a dialogue with the offenders was tried for as long as possible, but 
the use of force was never excluded. Aside from interventions by the police 
and army, this approach to dealing with terrorism had little public character, 
and it is hard to speak of a distinct policy domain at this time. 
This changed somewhat starting in 1991, with the publication of an annual 
report about the activities of the BVD. Terrorism was one of the areas of 
attention in the report. But it was not until after the attacks in the US on 11 
September 2001 that major changes occurred. In October 2001, the govern-
ment presented the Counter-terrorism and Security Action Plan, in which 43 
measures were announced to strengthen the detection of (potential) terror-
ists.
1
 An actual policy vision followed in June 2003. By way of the docu-
ment Terrorism and the Protection of Society, the so-called comprehensive 
approach (‘brede benadering’), already developed by the BVD in 1999, was 
declared official government policy.
2
  
The comprehensive approach combines a criminal (repressive) and preven-
tive approach, whereby the latter is aimed at the identification of individuals 
before they are prepared to use violence, i.e. processes of radicalisation. The 
2003 document referred to ‘addressing the roots of terrorism’, besides a lis-
ting of measures relating to detection, intervention, legal prosecution, sur-
veillance and the protection of persons and objects.
3
  
                                                          
1 In Dutch: ‘Actieplan terrorismebestrijding en veiligheid’. 
2 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003, p. 1. See also Abels 2008, p. 537. In Dutch: ‘Terrorisme en de 
bescherming van de samenleving’. 
3 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003, p. 6. 
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After the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, two additional policy documents 
were published with an emphasis on improving and intensifying existing 
measures. A new addition was the establishment of an alert system infor-
ming important business sectors or districts about the risk of a terrorist attack 
on the basis of a number of threat levels.
4
 In practice this system was, and 
still is not, widely used. Another priority was improving the coordination of 




3.2  The prevention of radicalisation 
The prime concern with detection and criminal prosecution meant that a 
concern with addressing the root causes of terrorism, which was outlined in 
the 2003 document, remained behind.
6
 This changed in August 2005 with 
the publication of a new policy document entitled Radicalism and Radicali-
sation, along with the policy framework Approach to Hotbeds of Radicali-
sation, published in December 2005. It meant that the ‘preliminary phase’ 
which could lead to terrorism became a domain of policymaking. The 
prevention of radicalisation included three elements: actively confronting 
radicals and their facilitators, promoting societal resilience, and reinforcing 
the bond of individuals and communities with society and the legal system.
7
 
Characteristic of the prevention of radicalisation was, and still is, the taking 
of administrative measures due to the impossibility or undesirability of 
starting criminal procedures.  
The Balkenende IV government (2007-2010; CDA, PvdA and CU) promised 
to take more action against radicalisation, leading to the publication of the 
government-wide Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 in 
August 2007. This plan mainly focused on ‘Islamic radicalisation and right-
wing extremist radicalisation’ as the most important societal concerns. 
Animal rights activism and ‘extreme left/anti-globalists’ were also mention-
ed, but regarded as less urgent matters.
8
 
                                                          
4 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2004a, p. 7. 
5 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2004b, p. 6. 
6 Abels 2012.  
7 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2005, p. 15; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 2005, p. 
2. 
8 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2007, p. 5-7. This distribution of attention is 
also evident from the way in which subsidies are spent, see KplusV organisatieadvies 2012, appendix 3. 
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3.3  Strategy and evaluation 
In November 2007, Democrats 66 (D66) MP Alexander Pechtold requested 
an exploration of how to conduct an evaluation of counter-terrorism policy.
9
 
In May 2009, the Suyver Committee, which was created for this purpose, 
concluded that the policy’s coherence could be improved.
10
 The Rutte I 
minority government (2010-2012; VVD and CDA with parliamentary sup-
port by the PVV) decided to draw up a National Counter-terrorism Strategy 
2011-2015. The strategy is organised according to five themes.   
In this counter-terrorism strategy, policy is organised on the basis of five 
themes. ‘Acquiring’ refers to gathering intelligence and information about 
(possible) threats. ‘Preventing’ refers to countering attacks as well as the 
phenomenon of terrorism itself. ‘Defending’ refers to taking protective 
measures with regard to individual persons, services or sectors as well as 
important sectors as a whole. ‘Preparing’ refers to dealing with the potential 
consequences of an attack, varying from crisis decision-making to increasing 
societal resilience. ‘Prosecuting’ refers to criminal prosecution whereby the 
emphasis lies on intervening in the preparatory stages of terrorist offences. 
Furthermore, the counter-terrorism strategy emphasises the importance to 
‘evaluate [it] periodically and test for legitimacy, effectiveness and 
proportionality’.
11
 The end of the strategy’s duration would constitute the 
first moment of evaluation. 
In the spring of 2016, the first evaluation of the strategy appeared and this 
was carried out by scholars in public administration experts affiliated with 
Utrecht University. The evaluation ascertained that the attention to and the 
capacity for counter-terrorism in the period 2011-2015 was subject to change 
due to shifting political priorities and budget cuts. One of the recommend-
dations was to make a distinction between a permanent and a flexible use of 
capacities.
12
 The new strategy, which was published in July 2016 and organ-




                                                          
9 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2007a. 
10 Commissie evaluatie antiterrorismebeleid 2009, p. 85. 
11 Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 110. 
12 Universiteit Utrecht 2016, p. 9. 
13 Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 4. 
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3.4  Dealing with jihadism 
In the spring of 2013, concerns about ‘jihad travellers’ became very 
prominent.
14
 In the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (DTN) 
32, a periodical communication informing the House of Representatives and 
the general public about the current terrorist threat, the NCTV mentioned a 
strong increase in the number of Dutch individuals travelling to conflict 
zones. In June 2014, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) 
identified a transformation of jihadism in the Netherlands: from small, 
independent, isolated networks to more connected, and visible networks.
15
 
Further policy development concerning the response to jihadist travellers 
occurred with the Integrated Approach to Jihadism Action Programme in 
August 2014.
16
 This programme consists of six elements: risk reduction of 
would-be jihadists, interventions for those travelling to conflict zones, 
radicalisation, social media, and exchange of information and cooperation. 
Although the Action Programme introduced several new measures, it 
continued the comprehensive approach with its combination of repressive 
and preventive measures. This corresponded with the counter-terrorism 
strategy which emphasised the importance of engaging in criminal 




                                                          
14 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2013, p. 2. 
15 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 2014, p. 5-6. 
16 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid and 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2014. 
17 Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 99. 
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4  Belgium 
4.1  An overview  
Since the 1980s Belgian counter-terrorism policy has focused on under-
standing and dealing with the roots of terrorism.
1
 In line with this focus on 
prevention, the Belgian government prepared the confidential Mosque Plan 
in 2002. This plan focused exclusively on radicalisation related to jihadist 
terrorism.
2
 In 2005 the name was changed to Action Plan Radicalism, also 
referred to as Plan R.
3
 This federal plan broadened the scope by also inclu-
ding ‘other expressions of inflammatory language, fundamentalist ideas, ra-
cist, anarchistic, and extremist opinions’.
4
 The document contained admini-
strative and legal measures of a proactive, preventive, and reactive character. 
Currently, it remains the cornerstone of the Belgian federal approach to 
dealing with jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq. Perio-




Although radicalisation had been on the agenda for quite some time in 
Belgium, the issue was not addressed in a resolute way.
6
 After the intro-
duction of Plan R, it took about ten years before preventive policy was 
actually realised on a decentralised level.
7
 This was partly due to the fact that 
radicalisation was not regarded as an urgent problem.
8
 Another factor was 
the complex state structure in Belgium (see the heading Complexity). Only 
after the departure of Belgian citizens to Syria in 2012 that additional plans 
were crafted on the federal, regional, local, and community-based level.
9
  
                                                          
1 Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 19. 
2 Personal communication R. Coolsaet, emeritus professor International Politics Ghent University 20 
August 2016. 
3 In Dutch: ‘Actieplan Radicalisme’. 
4 Saerens 2006-2007, p. 28. 
5 Belgische Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers 2007. 
6 Ponsaers 2016, p. 136. 
7 Coolsaet 2015. 
8 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
9 The regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and the Brussels-Capital Region) are area-based governments and 
constitute the first decentralised layer in the administrative organisation of Belgium together with the 
communities. The regions address local issues (including economics, employment, housing, and the 
living environment). The communities (Flemish, French, and German) are local governments and 
address local issues (including culture, education, health care, youth care, social assistance, family help, 
and migrant reception). 
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Due to the complex administrative structure, where each level develops its 
own plans, Belgium has relatively many policy documents for dealing with 
jihadism. Often the plans have been drawn up without considering the 
resources required to actually implement them.
10
 Most of the plans focus on 
tackling radicalisation. These plans therefore have a broader application that 
goes beyond an exclusive focus on dealing with jihadism. Nonetheless, they 
do mainly focus on (the threat posed by) jihadism.
11
 For instance, the 2014 
Flemish policy document Internal Administration and Urban Policy promi-
ses local level support in the preventive approach to radicalisation, with a 
specific focus on jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq.
12
 
In consultations – e.g. between the municipality and the police – the topic of 
dealing with jihadism is a regular theme.
13
 
4.2  New federal policy documents 
The first plan that was published in response to Syria travellers was the 
federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation of 2013, which sup-
plemented the broader federal Plan R.
14
 The programme advocates for a 
preventive approach to radicalisation. The further elaboration and implemen-
tation of the programme falls to cooperation between civil society and 
federal, regional, and local administrations.
15
 The programme is based on 




In addition, ten additional proposals were presented by the Minister of the 
Interior and Equal Opportunities. A number of these proposals were rejected 
by the other ministers – such as a proposal to amend the Mercenary Act by 
means of a Royal Decree, which would make participation in armed con-
flicts abroad an offence. According to the inner cabinet, the law against 
terrorism was sufficient. Other proposals, including strengthening border 
                                                          
10 W. Bruggeman, conference regarding the approach to radicalisation, Vilvoorde, 31 May 2016. 
11 Personal communication P. van Ostaeyen, historian and Arabist, 18 May 2015. 
12 Bruggemans and Hardyns 2016, p. 20. In Dutch: ‘Binnenlands Bestuur en Stedenbeleid’. 
13 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team member VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
14 In Dutch: ‘Preventieprogramma van gewelddadige radicalisering’. 
15 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Gelijke Kansen 2013, p. 2, 24. The regional level refers to both 
regions and communities. 
16 Delafortrie and Springael 2013. The article does not specify exactly who these ‘partners’ are. 
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controls and rules necessitating parental approval for children to travel 
abroad, were passed on to a working group for further ‘examination’.
17
 
After the attacks in Paris in January 2015 and the antiterrorism operation in 
Verviers that same month, a federal 12-Point Plan was published and almost 
completely implemented over the course of 2015. Although the emphasis of 
this plan was on counter-terrorism, several aspects deal with the prevention 
of radicalisation. For instance, the plan aimed to improve the detection and 
tackling of radicalisation by training prison staff and deploying ‘Islam 
consultants’. Shortly after, the Action Plan against Radicalisation in Prisons 
appeared.
18
 The 12-Point Plan also promised a revision of Plan R. This revis-
ed version, which was approved in December 2015 and made publicly 
accessible in June 2016, represents the basic structure for the response to 
radicalisation and emphasises the need for an integrated approach.
19
 The 
plan increased the number of actors involved in the prevention of radicali-
sation. After the attacks in Paris in November 2015, a federal 18-Point Plan 
appeared. Besides promising to free up extra funds for counter-terrorism and 
security, the plan also promised criminal and administrative measures for the 
purposes of detention, a widening of investigative powers, and more inten-
sive checks and surveillance by the police and military.
20
 
Alongside these plans, the course of Belgian policy was also set by several 
Circulars from 2014 and 2015. The Circular of 31 January 2014 concerns the 
improvement of coordination between various police, intelligence, and 
security services regarding the exchange of information in order to ensure an 
integrated approach to counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicali-
sation.
21
 The confidential Circulars of 21 August 2015 and 9 July 2015 also 
deal with the exchange of information between public agencies concerning 




                                                          
17 N.N. 2013a; 2013b; De Wit 2013. 
18 Eerste minister van België 2015, p. 10; FOD Justitie 2015. In Dutch: ‘Aanpak radicalisering in 
gevangenissen’. 
19 FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2016. 
20 Federale regering 2016. 
21 FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2014, p. 13028, 13030.  




4.3  Complexity 
The above mentioned federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation 
urges regional and local authorities to further develop preventive policies 
concerning radicalisation. This proved to be a relatively slow process, in 
large part due to Belgium’s complex state structure where decision-making 
is divided between the federal state, the three communities, and the three 
regions.
23
 State reforms transferred a large number of powers to the com-
munities and regions in January 2014. These transferred powers mostly 
concerned home care, metropolitan policy, social economy, and Houses of 
Justice. A cooperative agreement from the same month between the federal 
state, communities, and regions aimed to improve the cohesion of criminal 
law policies and security policy by more closely involving the communities 
and regions.
24
 As a result, the authority for reducing conditions contributing 
to radicalisation is at the decentralised level. 
To deal with this complexity the Framework Policy Document on Integrated 
Security (KIV) was introduced in June 2016.
25
 This policy document, appli-
cable until 2019, states that ‘it is not easy to draw up and realise effective 
security policies in [the Belgian] state structure, in which many fundamental 
powers were assigned to the federal states (…)’.
26
 This is why the KIV as-
sesses the cohesion between the various plans. The policy document pro-
vides a reference framework for other Belgian plans concerning security 
policy. 
4.4  Decentralised policy implementation 
Various plans were developed at a decentralised level following the public-
cation of the federal Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation in 2013. 
In terms of policies by Belgian communities, the Brussels-Capital Region 
presented an Overall Plan for Preventing and Countering Radicalism in 
January 2015.
27
 This plan will serve as a foundation for the Brussels-Capital 
Region’s Overall Security and Prevention Plan (not yet published at the time 
of writing).
28
 The French-speaking community (the ʽFédération Wallonie-
                                                          
23 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
24 Belgisch Staatsblad 2014. 
25 In Dutch: ‘Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid’. 
26 FOD Justitie 2016, p. 5. 
27 Vervoort 2016. In Dutch: ‘Globaal plan voor de preventie en bestrijding van radicalisme’. 
28 Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 14. In Dutch: ‘Globaal veiligheids- en preventieplan’. 
29 
 
Bruxellesʼ) also published Initiatives to Prevent Radicalism and Promote a 
Good Society in January 2015.
29
 This plan provides for, among others, the 
formation of a counter-radicalism coordination network, participation in the 
federal prevention strategy, and the implementation of anti-discrimination 
policy.
30
 Prevention policy specifically for the field of education is set out in 
Prevention Plan against Radicalism at School.
31
 The German-speaking com-
munity (the ʽDeutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiensʼ) published Strategy 





 This strategy is based on Plan R and the KIV, and is 
in force until the end of 2020.
33
  
The Flemish community prepared the draft policy document Prevention of 
Radicalisation Processes which may result in Extremism and Terrorism.
34
 
This was further refined in an action plan which was approved by the 
Flemish government in April 2015. Moreover, the Flemish government also 
published Points of Reference for a Local Approach to Radicalisation at the 
end of 2015, which explains in broad terms how local authorities can make 
policy with regard to the prevention of radicalisation.
35
 The policies of the 




Prior to the above mentioned plans, the four Flemish municipalities of 
Mechelen, Antwerpen, Vilvoorde, and Maaseik had already published a do-
cument called Controlling Muslim Radicalisation.
37
 This document, publis-
hed in July 2013, was intended as a guide for local authorities to develop 
policy with regard to preventing and dealing with radicalisation. In the 
meantime, various local authorities have developed their own policy plans. 
This applies in particular to municipalities which are confronted with 
jihadists travelling to and returning from Syria and Iraq. For example, the 
                                                          
29 In French: ‘Initiatives de prevention du radicalisme et du bien-vivre ensemble’. 
30 Hereby a reference is made to the Anti-Discrimination Plan 2014 – 2019. The counter-radicalism 
coordination network refers to the Réseau AntiRadicalisme (RAR). 
31 In French: ‘Un Plan de prévention contre le radicalisme à l’école’. 
32 In German: ʻStrategie zur Vorbeugung von gewaltsamen Radikalismus in der Deutschsprachigen 
Gemeinschaftʼ. 
33 Paasch 2016. 
34 In Dutch: ‘Preventie van radicaliseringsprocessen die kunnen leiden tot extremisme en terrorisme’. 
35 In Dutch: ‘Handvaten voor een lokale aanpak van radicalisering’. 
36 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
37 In Dutch: ‘Beheersen van moslim-radicalisering’. 
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Vilvoorde Municipal Council approved An Integrated Plan for Warmth and 
Security in May 2014.
38
  
Several smaller municipalities jointly formulated and implemented policies 
to distribute the financial costs. In certain cases the federal government 
provides funding.
39
 The federal government reserved 17 million euros for the 
Action Plan Against Radicalisation, Violent Extremism, and Terrorism in the 
Kanaalzone in February 2016.
40
 This extensive plan replaced an earlier 
proposal by the Molenbeek mayor Françoise Schepmans which she intended 
to implement in the wake of the November 2015 attacks.
41
 However, not 
every municipality has a policy in this field, but it is expected that local 
policy will develop further in the coming years.
42 
  
                                                          
38 In Dutch: ‘Een integraal plan voor warmte en veiligheid’. 
39 See for example: FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2015, p. 10; Lemmens 2014.  
40 In Dutch: ‘Actieplan tegen radicalisering, gewelddadig extremisme en terrorisme in de Kanaalzone’. 
41 N.N. 2016a; N.N. 2016b. 
42 P. Ponsaers, conference on the approach to radicalisation, Vilvoorde, 31 May 2016. 
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5  Denmark 
5.1  Counter-terrorism 
In June 2002, the Danish Parliament approved a series of legislative amend-
ments, better known as ‘regeringens anti-terrorpakke’.
1
 With these changes 
Denmark complied with international agreements that created a legal frame-
work for countering terrorism. Specific modifications involved the inclusion 
into the Danish criminal code of terrorism as a criminal offence as well as 
the direct or indirect provision of financial support for terrorist activities. 
The changes also allowed for the extradition of suspects to other EU member 
states. Moreover, the telecom sector was obliged to store data for at least one 
year for the purposes of detection and prosecution. Furthermore, these 
amendments allowed the government permission to access non-public data 
from information systems.
2
 The decision of Denmark to comply with these 
international obligations is notable given the Danish opt-out regarding EU 
cooperation on matter of police and justice.
3
  
In June 2004, the Danish government published A Changing World – New 
Threats, New Responses: Statement by the Government on the Fight Against 
Terrorism.
4
 In the report the threat of terrorism is described as complex and 
unpredictable and requiring a comprehensive effort.
5
 Three objectives are 
central to the approach: (1) tackling existing terrorist networks and groups; 
(2) developing a long-term approach aimed at removing the underlying cau-
ses of terrorism, this refers to the provision of developmental aid and conflict 
prevention abroad; and (3) preparing for attacks by protecting citizens and 
vital interests. Since 2004 a progress report detailing the progress on imple-
mented measures has appeared annually. Since 2004 the report has been 
published annually, to demonstrate progress on implemented measures. 
                                                          
1 The legislative proposal was adopted with 97 votes in favour and 10 votes against. 
2 Folketinget 2002. 
3 In case of measures resulting in the transfer of sovereignty, the opt-out means that EU measures can 
only be adopted when the Danish Parliament gives permission by a five-sixth majority or when there is a 
majority of MPs and a majority of voters in a referendum in favour. European Union 1997, p. 143. See 
also Lindekilde and Sedgwick 2012, p. 19. 
4 In Danish: ‘En verden i forandring – nye trusler, nye svar. Redegørelse fra regeringen om indsatsen 
mod terrorisme’. 
5 Udenrigsministeriet 2004, p. 3. 
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5.2  A new impulse 
The attacks in London in July 2005 prompted the Danish government to 
assess whether additional counter-terrorism measures were required. As a 
result, that November they published the Government Action Plan for Coun-
ter-terrorism.
6
 Again the necessity of a comprehensive approach regarding 
national and international policy was emphasised.
7
 The plan focused on the 
intelligence and security services: the domestic security and intelligence ser-
vice (PET) and the military intelligence service (FE).
8
 It listed improve-
ments in terms of the functioning of the organisations, their mutual coopera-
tion, and deployment of resources. Also mentioned are the tightening of 
regulations regarding the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Denmark 
hostile to democratic values. Another series of measures concerned impro-
ving civil preparedness in the event of an attack. 
In addition, the plan contained measures for improving civil preparedness in 
the event of attack. It also considered important entering into dialogue with 
the Muslim community as well as research into terrorism and radicalisation. 
Nevertheless, most of the plan is made up of measures for improving the 
detection of (potential) terrorists whereby in particular broader access to 
information is the key element. To implement the measures, the Danish 
Parliament adopted the ‘anti-terrorpakke II’, a series of legislative amend-
ments, in June 2006.
9
 
5.3  The prevention of radicalisation 
In Denmark the prevention of radicalisation started locally with pilot pro-
jects set up in Aarhus and Copenhagen. In 2007 the city of Aarhus trained 
fifty crime prevention workers in recognising signals of radicalisation.
10
 This 
was not in response to any particular event, but rather was an anticipatory 
measure inspired by the Amsterdam Action Plan We Citizens of Amsterdam, 
                                                          
6 In Danish: ‘Regeringens handlingsplan for terrorbekæmpelse’. 
7 Statsministeriet 2005, p. 4.  
8 The PET or ‘Politiets Efterretningstjeneste’ and the FE or ‘Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste’. 
9 The legislative proposal was adopted with 91 votes in favour and 26 votes against. 
10 Aarhus, which has 300,000 inhabitants, is the second largest city in Denmark. For the trial project, see 
Integrationsministeriet 2008, p. 11-12; Kühle and Lindekilde 2010, p. 13. 
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In January 2009 the Danish government presented a national plan – A 
Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and 
Radicalisation Among Young People.
12
 The plan had a broad focus and 
included initiatives to make contact with young people influenced by extre-
mist ideas, promote the participation of young people in society on the basis 
of their rights and obligations, start a dialogue with young people and pro-
vide information about Danish society and its opportunities, promote demo-
cratic values, and counter isolation in vulnerable neighbourhoods.
13
 
The 2009 plan was met with great opposition. Criticism primarily came from 
academics and communities which were the targets of interventions; the 
majority of the population was much less critical.
14
 The main points of 
criticism were that the plan would contribute to stigmatisation of entire com-
munities as a collective risks for society, and that radicalisation was inter-
preted as a security matter instead of a social issue.
15
 In the end, substantial 
parts of the plan were not implemented, in particular those concerning inte-
gration, countering discrimination, and promoting social cohesion.
16
 Conse-
quently, in a new plan published in September 2014 and drawn up by the 
centre-left government that took office in 2011, this focus on integration and 
social cohesion did not return.
17
 The new plan emphasised individual inter-
ventions, both to prevent radicalisation and extremism and to assist indivi-
duals re-integrating in society after leaving jihadist circles or after return 
from conflict areas in Syria and Iraq.
18
 
                                                          
11 For the motivation for the project, see Integrationsministeriet 2008, p. 11; For the Dutch inspiration, 
see Hemmingsen 2015, p. 31. 
12 In Danish: ‘En fælles og tryg fremtid. Handlingsplan om forebyggelse af ekstremistiske holdninger og 
radikalisering blandt unge’. The plan was also published in English. 
13 Regeringen 2009. The other areas of attention are: preventing extremism and radicalisation in prisons 
and improving knowledge, international cooperation and partnerships with various institutions and 
organisations.  
14 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016. 
15 Hemmingsen 2015, p. 12; personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016. 
16 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016. 
17 The plan is called ‘Preventing Radicalisation and Extremism. The Government’s Action Plan’, in Danish: 
‘Forebyggelse af radikalisering og ekstremisme. Regeringens handlingsplan’. 
18 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016. 
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5.4  The Aarhus model 
The departure of several dozen young people from Aarhus to Syria in 2013 
led the city to initiate the Aarhus model, a targeted strategy carried out in 
cooperation with the police of East Jutland.
19
 This strategy provides a range 
of services (such as psychological help, health care, education, and a per-
sonal mentor) for suspected travellers and returnees to facilitate their re-
integration in society.
20
 This approach has become the national standard in 
Denmark and has attracted a lot of international media attention.
21
 It is us-
ually described as an exception to the more repressive approaches of other 
European countries. What is often overlooked is that (suspected) travellers 
and returnees will only receive help with their re-integration when they do 





                                                          
19 Personal communication with Danish counter-terrorism expert, 12 April 2016; Bundsgaard 2015. For a 
discussion about the (theoretical) assumptions of the model, see Bertelsen 2015. 
20 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016. 
21 Hemmingsen 2015, p. 18. For the international media attention, see Crouch and Henley 2015; Hooper 
2014. 
22 Personal communication with Danish radicalisation expert, 4 May 2016; Bertelsen 2015, p. 245. 
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6  Germany 
6.1  Historic context 
The response of the West German government to the extreme-left political 
violence of the ‘Rote Armee Faktion’ (RAF) during the 1970s is often re-
garded as the starting point of counter-terrorism in Germany.
1
 During that 
period the authorities were given broader powers of investigation, certain 
civil liberties were restricted (prisoners were refused access to lawyers under 




In the early 1990s, politically motivated violence was increasingly commit-
ted by groups with a xenophobic, racist, and/or right-extreme world view.
3
 
Concerns about right-wing extremist groups dominated the domestic security 
agenda, but this changed after the attacks on 11 September 2001.
4
 To the 
horror of many Germans, it appeared that one group of the aircraft hijackers 
had lived in Hamburg for years, where they had made preparations for the 
attacks. After the attacks, ‘Islamist Terrorism’ became a much discussed top-
ic, both among the public and the authorities.
5
 
6.2  ‘Islamist Terrorism’ as a new priority  
Hardly a week after the attacks in the US, the first counter-terrorism mea-
sures were put in place by the Bundestag, the German federal Parliament. 
These concerned restricting immigration in order to refuse entry or deport 
individuals who are considered a threat to national security, and the authority 
to ban religious extremist organisations. The latter measure had already been 
under consideration for some time.  
                                                          
1 See for instance Malthaner and Waldmann 2003. See chapter three of De Graaf 2010 for a detailed 
study on how the firm response by the West German federal government against the RAF actually 
contributed to social unrest. 
2 See Mueller 2014, p. 330 for the criminalisation of membership of a terrorist organisation. See 
Albrecht 2006 for a summary of civil liberties restrictions. 
3 Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2001, p. 276. 
4 Concerns about right-wing extremism became a major concern again in 2011 when it appeared that 
the violence of a right-wing extremist splinter group (‘Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund’, NSU) had 
gone unnoticed for years. 
5 Compare for instance: Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2001, and 
Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2006. In the former document, 
ʽIslamist Terrorismʼ was not mentioned. The quote is in the 2006 document on p. 134. 
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A second package of measures followed in January 2002: the Counter-terror-
ism Act (TBG).
6
 This act aimed at improving the exchange of information 
between the various intelligence and security services and the police, and 
broadened the authority of the intelligence and security services. However, 
the act was criticised for not adequately protecting personal data.
7
 Several 
measures introduced by the TBG contained sunset clauses, which required 
an evaluation by the Ministry of the Interior (BMI).
8
 The act was extended in 
January 2007 by way of the Counter-terrorism Supplemental Act (TBEG) 




Four years later, in October 2011, the Bundestag approved an extension of 
the TBEG, although not without protest.
10
 Both the Social Democrats and 
the Greens requested an evaluation of the legislation by an external party, 
but their proposals did not receive enough votes.
11
 Instead a government 
committee conducted an evaluation in 2013, reviewing the functioning of all 
involved government agencies, their objectives and competences concerning 
counter-terrorism and its relation to the law.
12
 This evaluation was generally 
positive. The committee did observe that in case of preventive intervention 
the use of criminal law has raised concerns from a constitutional law per-
spective.
13
 The TBEG was assessed again in December 2015, after which 
particular provisions of the act were extended again, this time until January 
2021. It concerns the access by the intelligence and security services to 
information from telecommunications providers in order to better detect 
terrorist organisations and intervene in a more targeted manner.
14
 
                                                          
6 Officially the act is referred to as ‘Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus’ or 
alternatively ‘Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz’, see Deutscher Bundestag 2002, p. 361. 
7 Deutscher Bundestag 2016a. 
8 In German: ‘Bundesministerium des Innern’. 
9 Hellmuth 2016, p. 108-109; Deutscher Bundestag 2015a, p. 8-9. The official name is ‘Gesetz zur 
Ergänzung des Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetzes’ or alternatively 
‘Terrorismusbekämpfungsergänzungsgesetz’, see Deutscher Bundestag 2007, p. 2. 
10 Deutscher Bundestag 2011a, p. 1-2. 
11 Deutscher Bundestag 2011b; Deutscher Bundestag 2010. The Social Democrats or the 
ʽSozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlandsʼ (SPD) and the Greens or ʽBündnis 90/Die Grünenʼ. 
12 Deutscher Bundestag 2015a, p. 13. 
13 Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2013, p. 262. 
14 Deutscher Bundestag 2016b, p. 2. 
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At the federal level Germany has a comprehensive, but non-public Strategy 
of the Federal Government for the Combating of International Terrorism.
15
 
The objectives of this strategy were based on those of the 2005 EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy. The German strategy is focused on disrupting terrorist 
structures, addressing the causes of terrorism through prevention and de-
radicalisation, protecting the population, reducing the vulnerability of the 
country, and improving international cooperation.
16
 
After three successive violent incidents, of which two incidents were alleged 
to be related to IS (Islamic State), the German Minister of the Interior 
Thomas de Maizière presented a new package of measures to promote 
security in August 2016.
17
 The package contained three ‘cornerstones’: (1) 
measures relating to the personnel, material, and organisational resourcing of 
the security services; (2) measures relating to prevention and integration as 
key ingredients for a ‘sustainable’ security policy; (3) a rigorous and tough 
approach for dealing with dangerous individuals (‘Gefährder’), persons 
considered a risk to national security, as well as individuals feeding radi-
calisation.
18
 In the media this was portrayed as an new security concept, but 
the measures were essentially an intensification of existing policies aimed at 
prevention, detection, and prosecution.
19
 
6.3  The prevention of radicalisation 
The prevention of ‘Islamistischer Radikalisierung’ is included in the Strategy 
of the Federal Government for the Prevention of Extremism and Democracy 
Promotion, which also addresses racism, xenophobia and left-wing and 
right-wing extremism.
20
 This strategy aligns with earlier policies of the fede-
                                                          
15 Urban 2006, p. 126. In German: ‘Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Bekämpfung des internationalen 
Terrorismus’. 
16 Bundesministerium des Innern 2016a. 
17 The attacks related to IS are those on a train near Würzburg on 18 July 2016 and at a music festival in 
Ansbach on 25 July 2016. The other attack was a shooting in a shopping centre in Munich in which the 
perpetrator seemed to have acted on the basis of personal motives. 
18 Bundesministerium des Innern 2016b. 
19 N.N. 2016c. 
20 Deutscher Bundestag 2016c, p. 7-8. In German: ‘Strategie der Bundesregierung zur 
Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung’. The study did not permit to trace when Islamist 
radicalisation became part of the federal strategy for preventing extremism. The intention was 
expressed in 2006 to develop an action plan in the field of ‘Islamismusprävention’. See 
Bundesministerium des Innern and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2006, p. 187. It cannot be established 
whether this plan was the prelude for including the prevention of violent Islamism as part of the broader 
extremism prevention strategy.  
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ral government to counter extremism that date back to 1992, although for a 
long time they were mainly concerned with right-wing extremism. There are 
two key elements of this strategy: promoting democratic thought and 
conduct, and developing measures for preventing extremism.
21
 
Germany does not have a national strategy specifically dealing with jihadism 
and the phenomenon travellers to and returnees from conflict zones in 
Syria/Iraq. The Interior Ministers of the federal states indicated in December 
2015 that they needed such a strategy in order to improve the cohesion of 
measures against jihadism and those travelling to conflict zones.
22
 
                                                          
21 Deutscher Bundestag 2016c, p. 7. 
22 Deutscher Bundestag 2015b, p. 3. 
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Figure 4: Timeline Germany; policies and events 
 
  
7  France 
7.1  Historic context 
French counter-terrorism has a reputation for being repressive and tough.
1
 
The current French strategy can be traced to the 1980s and 1990s. Two 
bodies were created to improve the operational coordination between the 
police and the intelligence services. In 1984, the Counter-terrorism Coordin-
ation Unit (UCLAT) was set up as part of the Ministry of the Interior, and in 
1986, the Counter-terrorism Coordination Service (SCLAT) was established 
within the Ministry of Justice.
2
 There was no inter-ministerial coordination, 
and hence no centralisation of counter-terrorism activities, but as a means of 
improving coordination the establishment of UCLAT and SCLAT was 
considered to be a success.
3
  
A series of bombings in 1986 led to the belief that French authorities were 
not capable of suppressing this violence.
4
 A new law adopted that same year 
defined terrorist offences and centralised counter-terrorism efforts by creat-
ing the position of the investigative judge with the authority to establish 
whether an act should be prosecuted as a terrorist offence.
5
 This meant that 
dealing with acts of terrorism became part of regular criminal proceedings. 
This was a considerable departure from the prosecution of attacks occurring 
in France that related to the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). In 
order to try these acts, a special national security court was convened in 
1963 which operated outside the legal system; it was discontinued by the 
then newly elected President François Mitterrand in 1982.
6
  
The 1994 White Paper on Defence referred to terrorism as ‘undoubtedly the 
most important non-military threat’ to French security.
7
 The aforementioned 
                                                          
1 Shapiro 2007, p. 134, 157; Hellmuth 2015, p. 979. 
2 Shapiro 2007, p. 139-140. 
3 Shapiro 2007, p. 140, 151. 
4 Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 71-73. The acts were claimed by the (until then unknown) Committee for 
Solidarity with Political Prisoners from the Near East (CSPPA). 
5 Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 77-78. For the definition, see L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 1986, p. 
10956. 
6 Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 77. In French: ‘Le Cour de Sûrete de l’Etat’. 
7 In French: ‘Livre Blanc sur la Défense’. The original text is: ‘L’action terroriste est sans doute la 
principale menace non militaire qui soit en mesure d’affecter notre sécurité’ (translation by the author), 
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1986 law was amended in 1996. A series of bombings in 1995 followed 
earlier government attempts to disrupt the activities of the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) on French soil. The GIA was one of the participants in the 
Algerian civil war (1992-2002) and regarded France, due to its role as 
former coloniser, as an enemy.
8
 The 1996 legal amendment criminalised pre-
paratory acts, in this case a conspiracy to commit terrorist offences. This 
amendment made preventive intervention possible in case of serious indica-
tions that law breaking was imminent.
9
 France thus continued to develop its 
approach to counter-terrorism whereby the potential breach of the law is 




7.2  Counter-terrorism 
The next legal amendment followed shortly after the attacks on 11 Septem-
ber 2001. This amendment, which was already under consideration well 
before the attacks, broadened the legal requirements for gathering telecom-
munications data as well as sanctioning preventive body searches and the 
checking of luggage, freight, airmail, planes, and vehicles in public spaces.
11
 
Since a legal definition of terrorist offences already existed in French law – 
not all countries had criminalised this activity before 11 September – the 
2001 legislative amendment is not regarded as a drastic innovation, but 
rather as the intensification of an already existing approach. As such, the 
attacks on 11 September 2001 are also referred to as a ‘non-event’ in the 
context of French counter-terrorism policy.
12
 
French counter-terrorism policies were further modified and intensified 
through a number of legislative amendments adopted between 2001 and 
2012.
13
 Two themes predominated: broadening access to databases for law 
enforcement and intelligence services in order to facilitate preventive inter-
                                                                                                                                        
see République Française 1994, p. 17. Also see Bigo 2006, p. 19. The previous White Paper dated from 
1972. 
8 Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 79-80. 
9 L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 1996. 
10 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10; Bigo 2006, p. 30; Hellmuth 2016, p. 207.  
11 Hellmuth 2016, p. 199-201. For the legislative text, see L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2001.  
12 Bigo 2006, p. 8. Also see Shapiro 2007, p. 161. 
13 L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2001; L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2002; L’Assemblée 
nationale en le Sénat 2003; L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2006; L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 
2011; L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2012. 
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vention, and extending investigative powers.
14
 A number of these measures 
included sunset clauses, meaning that the continuation of the measure would 
be subject to periodical approval by Parliament. However, several of these 
temporary measures were given a permanent status before their effectiveness 
had been evaluated.
15
 Additionally, attempts were made to improve opera-
tional and policy coordination by creating new bodies at the presidential and 
ministerial levels as well as among the intelligence and security services; 
Part Two will discuss this in greater detail. 
7.3  The prevention of radicalisation 
The prevention of radicalisation is a relatively new policy domain in France. 
White Papers from 2006 and 2008 contained minimal references to the term. 
Interest in the prevention of radicalisation increased after the shootings by 
Mohammed Merah (2012), the attack in the Jewish museum in Brussels 
(2014), and the departure of youngsters to Syria and Iraq. The 2013 White 
Paper on Defence and National Security mentioned the need to develop the 
prevention of radicalisation, but without specifying this in any detail.
16
 The 




While this plan from 2014 primarily strengthened investigative powers, such 
as the ability to withhold travel documents of individuals suspected of 
travelling to conflict zones, the plan also included soft policy. For instance, a 
telephone hotline was proposed to assist those near to persons thought to be 
radicalising as well as intervention programmes for those believed to be 
radicalising, including with a focus on leaving behind this condition.
18
 
Lower administrative levels – ‘régions’ and ‘départements’ – were called up-
on to develop this strategy.
19
 The introduction of soft policy constituted a 
departure from the strong emphasis on law breaking as the moment of inter-
vention. 
                                                          
14 Bigo 2006, p. 35, 53-55. 
15 Hellmuth 2016, p. 206, 215. 
16 The White Paper is available in English. Ragazzi 2014, p. 3, 10. Also see République Française 2013, p. 
99. 
17 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10. In French: ‘Prévention de la radicalisation et accompagnement des familles’. 
18 Le ministre de l’intérieur 2014a. The withdrawal of travel documents of suspected travellers to 
conflict areas in Syria/Iraq became possible later that year, see L’Assemblée nationale en le Sénat 2014. 
19 Le ministre de l’intérieur 2014a. France has an administrative organisation whereby the country is 
divided into 18 ‘régions’, which are then divided into in 102 ‘départements’; these are then split into the 
most basic administrative units, 36,658 ‘communes’. 
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New measures followed after the attacks on the offices of the weekly maga-
zine Charlie Hebdo (2015). In April 2015, a three-year plan was launched to 
confront racism, anti-Semitism, and spreading hate, both online and 
offline.
20
 The plan did not specifically refer to counter-terrorism or the 
prevention of radicalisation, instead highlighting the recent increases in 
racist and anti-Semitic statements, but the attack on Charlie Hebdo provided 
an additional motivation to adopt the plan.
21
 The government also announ-
ced that it would address radicalisation in prisons. Prisoners at risk of 
radicalisation would be systematically separated from the rest of the prison 
population, which at the time of the announcement only happened on an 
incidental basis. In addition, the number of prison imams would be increased 
and their training improved.
22
  
Fifty new measures were introduced several months after the attacks in Paris 
in November 2015. This Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism 
(May 2016) replaced the previously mentioned 2014 plan.
23
 It was one of the 
first documents, besides the 2006 White Paper, to specifically deal with 
counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. Previous White 
Papers from 2008 and 2013 discussed counter-terrorism within a broader 
context of national security. The 2016 plan provided for the expansion of 
powers of detection and prosecution by improving the gathering and sharing 
information, amongst others by imposing stricter regulations on the sale of 
prepaid cards for mobile phones and the use of passenger name records data 
from airlines for detection. Additionally, the plan from May 2016 focused on 
strengthening citizenship through education, supporting persons in contact 
with individuals suspected of radicalising, preventing radicalisation in 
schools, creating space for criticism of ideologies informing radicalisation, 
and an open exchange of knowledge about Islam. Besides, the plan required 





                                                          
20 Premier Ministre 2015. 
21 Rubin and Breeden 2015. 
22 Hellmuth 2015, p. 989. Also see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 2015, p. 14. 
23 In French: ‘Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme’. 
24 Premier Ministre 2016, p. 7-9. 
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8  United Kingdom 
8.1  The counter-terrorism strategy 
Strategies for dealing with jihadism in the UK mainly fall under the umbrella 
of CONTEST: the British national counter-terrorism strategy. CONTEST 
originated in 2003, but it was only made public in 2006.
1
 Revised versions 
followed in 2009 (CONTEST 2) and 2011 (CONTEST 3). Despite the dura-
tion of CONTEST 3 ended in 2015, no new version has been published yet. 
The strategy has had four so-called workstreams since 2003: Pursue, Pre-
vent, Protect, and Prepare.
2
 Substantial changes were in particular made with 
regard to Prevent. Before the attacks on 7 July 2005 in London – during the 
term of the then-classified first CONTEST strategy – British counter-
terrorism policy mainly focused on external threats. A ‘community-based’ 
preventive approach was not a new concept in the UK, but it was considered 
to be redundant after the attacks on 11 September 2001.
3
 Following the 
attacks in 2005, however, prevention became an integral part of British 
counter-terrorism policy.  
A key part of Prevent is the Channel programme, which was piloted in 2007 
and administered across England and Wales in 2012. Channel is focused on 
providing early support for individuals identified as vulnerable to radicali-
sation.
4
 After a person has been referred to the Channel programme, a 
network of several partners offers tailor-made support services. The Prevent 
strategy became the cornerstone of CONTEST. It is the only workstream to 
be delineated in a separate public policy document in 2011.
5
 Prevent has 
been placed on a statutory footing by the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015. As a result, particular institutions such as the educational sector, 
have been given a Prevent Duty. This means that they are obliged to report 
suspicious behaviour. 
                                                          
1 Mastroe 2016, p. 52. 
2 Pursue focuses on preventing attacks (mainly through criminal proceedings), Prevent focuses on 
preventing developing terrorist activities or supporting terrorism, Protect focuses on protecting against 
attacks (including measures regarding infrastructure and border control), while Prepare focuses on 
minimising the impact when an attack occurs. 
3 Briggs 2010, p. 971. 
4 HM Government 2011b, p. 57. 
5 Referred to as Prevent Strategy, see HM Government 2011b. 
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The British prevention strategies have been controversial. Initially there was 
criticism that the government was subsidising Muslim organisations with a 
radical ideology.
6
 This concern diminished after the revision of Prevent in 
2011. Prevent was also criticised for being discriminatory toward Muslims 
and for engaging with Muslim communities only for the purposes of 
intelligence gathering.
7
 A recurring point of critique has been that while the 
government recognises Muslim communities as important partners in Pre-
vent, it also regards these communities as ‘suspect’. Muslim organisations, 
journalists, academics, and teachers have often mentioned the counter-
productive effect of Prevent – creating grievance and distrust among Mus-
lims and against the government itself.
8
 The above-mentioned obligation to 
report suspicious behaviour, which has applied since 2015 for teachers and 
staff at institutions in the fields of health, youth care, and social work, has 
been met with resistance.  
Prevent has not been regularly evaluated by the Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation, in contrast with other counter-terrorism legislation. 
The previous Reviewer, David Anderson, emphasised the importance of an 
independent evaluation, noting that ‘Prevent has become a more significant 
source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial 
powers’.
9
 The most recent controversy concerns the risk assessment (ERG-
22+), on the basis of which persons may be referred to the Channel program-
me. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has expressed serious doubts about 
the quality of this risk assessment.
10
  
8.2  Evaluation and a shift in focus 
Prevent has been evaluated by the national government since 2007. This 
entails supervising the allocation of financial resources to local authorities. 
This is done through the Local Area Agreement (LAA) and the National 
Indicator Set (NIS), in which the objectives for local authorities have been 
established. Achievement of these objectives results in extra funds for local 
                                                          
6 See for example: Durodié 2015. 
7 See for example: Briggs 2010; Lister et. al. 2015; Gayle 2016; Durodié 2015; Price 2016; Jeory and 
Cockburn 2016; Anderson 2016. 
8 See for example: Lister et. al. 2015; Gayle 2016; Anderson 2016; Shabi 2016. 
9 Anderson 2016, p. 3. 






 These instruments were introduced to improve the consistency 
between national and local government priorities, and to offer more 
opportunities for local administrators and service providers to respond to the 
requirements of their local communities.
12
 In that vein, LAAs determine the 




In CONTEST 2 (2009), it was announced that for the first time counter-
terrorism policy would be monitored on the basis of a Public Service 
Agreement (PSA). Each PSA would include the objectives and response-
bilities for the actors involved. This proved to be short-lived, as the new 
coalition government already abolished the PSA system by June 2010. Later 
that year, also the LAA and the NIS were discontinued. According to the 
new government, they focused too much on what the national government 
required instead of what was needed on a local level.
14
  
The LAA and the NIS were succeeded by the Structural Reform Plan. 
Whereas the LAA was result-based, the Structural Reform Plan reflects the 
position that the ‘government cannot commit to outcomes, but can commit to 
inputs’.
15
 Besides evaluation on the basis of resources and objectives, the 
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) has been evaluating Prevent on the basis of 
insights from behavioural-scientific literature since 2010.
16
 The BIT started 
as part of the British government, but is presently owned by both the 
government and Nesta, a foundation aimed at innovation. 
The first formal evaluation of CONTEST by the government took place in 
2010. That same year, the British government also published its first public 
annual report on CONTEST. Shortly after, CONTEST 3 made such annual 
reports on the progress of CONTEST mandatory. These annual reports illu-
strate the shifting focus of the CONTEST strategy. On paper the four work-
streams, as described in CONTEST 3, focus on Al Qaida as well as related 
groups and individuals. These were regarded as the most serious threat to the 
UK when the strategy was formulated.
17
 However, subsequent annual reports 
                                                          
11 See Department for Communities and Local Government 2008. See also Mastroe 2016, p. 53. 
12 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, p. 15. 
13 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, p. 102. 
14 HM Government 2010. 
15 Panchamia and Thomas 2014, p. 9. 
16 Mastroe 2016, p. 55. 
17 HM Government 2011. 
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demonstrate that the strategy’s focus has recently shifted toward IS and the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq.
18
 
8.3  Key developments within CONTEST 
Besides the shift in focus, another notable difference between the strategy 
from 2006 and the revisions from 2009 and 2011 is the size of the docu-
ments. In terms of the number of pages, CONTEST 2 and 3 are much more 
extensive than the first published version in 2006.
19
 This change is probably 
based on the introduction of counter-terrorism strategy as a communicative 
instrument. Reporting about threats and policy was not only regarded as 
important for fostering openness and trust, but also relevant for raising 
public awareness. As former Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated in the 
foreword of CONTEST 2: ‘if people are better informed about the threat 
they will be more vigilant but also more assured’.
20
 However, not every-
thing is shared. For instance, each workstream has a detailed implemen-
tation plan which is not made public for security reasons.
21
 
A second development is a change in terminology in 2009, replacing ‘violent 
extremism’ with ‘extremism’.
22
 The justification for the change was that 
extremism may contribute to a climate in which individuals might slip into 
violent behaviour. This implies a certain degree of causality between extrem-
ism and violent extremism. The change was controversial: triggering debate 
among academics about the assumed causal relationship, and creating 
uncertainty among local authorities and communities about what to do.
23
 For 
instance, contradictory statements by the national government led to con-
fusion on whether Prevent should focus on other forms of extremism aside 
from extremism related to Islam. In response, the 2011 revision made clear 




                                                          
18 HM Government 2013; HM Government 2014; HM Government 2015a; Stuart 2014; Vidino et. al. 
2014, p. 15. 
19 The first public version of CONTEST consists of 36 pages. With CONTEST 2 and 3 this is 176 and 132 
pages respectively. 
20 HM Government 2009, p. 6; See also Gregory 2009, p. 2. 
21 HM Government 2009, p. 138. 
22 HM Government 2009; Briggs 2010, p. 975. 
23 Briggs 2010, p. 975-976. 
24 HM Government 2011. 
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A third development concerns the relationship between Prevent and so-
called community cohesion. The evaluation by the new conservative-liberal 
coalition government from 2010 stated that the focus on integration in the 
original strategy drawn up by Labour came at the expense of efforts aimed at 
preventing (home-grown) terrorism.
25
 Therefore, former Minister of the Inte-
rior Theresa May referred to the strategy as ‘flawed’.
26
 In response, the 2011 
Prevent strategy focused on confronting extremist ideas. With this the British 
government hoped to make a clearer distinction between the agenda of Pre-
vent, which is the responsibility of the Office for Security and Counter-Ter-
rorism (OSCT), and that on community cohesion, which is the responsibility 
of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).  
Before the 2011 Prevent revision, initiatives on community cohesion were 
part of Prevent, and were the responsibility of the DCLG. As a result, com-
munity cohesion-related policy was partly linked to counter-terrorism, with 
the consequence that Prevent was criticised as a government instrument for 
collecting intelligence, rather than a means of confronting radicalisation and 
extremism. In addition, the overlap caused friction between the OSCT and 
the DCLG. This was due to, amongst other things, a different interpretation 
of what ‘community engagement’ through Prevent implied. In CONTEST 3 
from 2011 the Prevent and community cohesion domains were separated. 
8.4  The new counter-extremism strategy 
In October 2015, the Counter-Extremism Strategy was published. It stated 
that British values are under pressure as a result of ‘extremists operating at a 
pace and scale not before seen’, and that the UK ‘[w]ill meet this challenge 
with a new and more assertive approach’.
27
 The strategy focuses on four 
points: countering extremist ideology; building a partnership between all ac-
tors committed to countering extremism; disrupting extremists; and promo-
ting cohesion through the Cohesive Communities Programme.
28
  
According to Karen Bradley, Minister for Culture, Media, and Sports, the 
counter-extremism strategy is not part of counter-terrorism, because extrem-
ism is a broader category than terrorism. However, the Parliamentary Joint 
                                                          
25 HM Government 2011b, p. 6, 30. 
26 HM Government 2011b, p. 1. 
27 HM Government 2015b, p. 9. 
28 HM Government 2015b. 
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Committee on Human Rights indicated that the distinction between these 
two terms is not clear, as Prevent also deals with countering extremism (see 
also the notes on terminology in the previous paragraph). Moreover, the 
committee doubted the need for new measures to counter extremism, believ-
ing the current instruments would suffice.
29
 A legal framework for counter-
extremism measures has been announced, the Counter-Extremism and Safe-




                                                          
29 Joint Committee on Human Rights 2016, p. 26. 
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9  United States 
9.1  Counter-terrorism policy 
The Office for Combatting Terrorism was established in the US after the 
hostage-taking of Israeli athletes by a Palestinian splinter group during the 
Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Housed as part of the Department of State 
(DoS), this unit was responsible for developing and coordinating internatio-
nal counter-terrorism policies. An official counter-terrorism strategy follow-
ed in 1983, after bombings in Lebanon killed numerous American soldiers. 
This included the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), wherein the 
US helped other countries to increase their knowledge of terrorism and stra-
tegies for its suppression. These efforts were foremost characterised by 
diplomacy and law enforcement, and counter-terrorism was considered an 
international affair rather than a domestic one. During the Cold War the US 
mainly focused on threats from other states and the ways in which these 
states could be deterred. The threat of non-state actors did not fit in this pic-
ture, and therefore did not become part of the national security strategy. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice 
(DoJ) grew more concerned about terrorism after the bombings in New York 
in 1993 and Oklahoma in 1995.
1
 This led to the 1996 Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The act’s provisions included new 
federal powers for the prosecution of suspects, more severe forms of punish-
ment, and a ban on fundraising for terrorist purposes. Two years later the 
FBI listed counter-terrorism as its top priority in the ‘FBI Strategic Plan 
1998-2003’.
2
 However, counter-terrorism was not part of the national secur-
ity strategy. 
Counter-terrorism became the foremost security priority after the attacks on 
11 September 2001. For the topic of homeland security a new ministry – the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – was created in 2002. The Home-
land Security Advisory System (HSAS) was introduced: a threat scale with 
five colours/levels, ranging from green to red.
3
 Counter-terrorism had a pro-
                                                          
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004. 
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004. 
3 The colour illustrates the risk of attacks: green (‘low’), blue (‘general’), yellow (‘significant’) and orange 
(‘high’) and red (‘severe’). 
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minent place in the new 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States 
(NSS), also referred to as the Bush doctrine.
4
 Military action became more 
dominant in US external counter-terrorism policy, with law enforcement and 
diplomacy receding to the background. This was reflected in the new lang-
uage introduced during the presidency of George W. Bush: a ‘global war on 
terror’. The contours of this strategy would largely remain unchanged under 
Bush’s leadership. The NSS proved to be a blueprint for the National 
Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (NSCT), introduced in 2003, and the two 
revised versions in 2006.
5
 The objective of the National Strategy for Home-
land Security (2002) was to complement the NSS and strengthen the NSCT. 
Counter-terrorism policy shifted under the presidency of Barack Obama. The 
NSCT from 2011 no longer referred to a ‘global war on terror’, but to being 
in a state of war with Al Qaida.
6
 At the same time drone strikes were increas-
ingly utilised.
7
 Moreover, there was a greater focus on the (potential) threats 
domestically, spurred by incidents including the departure of at least 20 




Additionally, the HSAS was replaced by the National Terrorism Advisory 
System (NTAS), designed to improve communication with the public on 
(potential) threats. The NTAS accomplished this through disseminating Al-
erts and Bulletins. The first Bulletin was published in December 2015 – two 
weeks after the attack in San Bernardino, California. In this Bulletin the 
DHS expressed its concerns about domestic violent extremism and terrorists 
who may be considering various targets. The second Bulletin once again em-
phasised these concerns, referencing the attacks in San Bernardino, Paris, 
Brussels, and the shootings in Orlando.
9
 
9.2  The emergence of CVE policy 
The American federal government launched a plan on countering violent 
extremism (CVE) for the first time in 2011, in response to the increased 
                                                          
4 White House 2002. 
5 U.S. Government 2003; U.S. Government 2006; Nacos 2010, p. 174-175. 
6 White House 2011c. 
7 Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2016; Serle 2014. 
8 White House 2011c; Vidino and Hughes 2015. 
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security undated a. 
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threat of extremism since 2009.
10
 This strategy, called Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism, has three objectives: increasing in-
volvement of the federal government in communities, developing CVE 
expertise, and countering extremist propaganda.
11
  
Responsibility for the plan’s implementation was given to local admini-
strations, with support from the federal government where necessary. A few 
months after its introduction, the plan was expanded to include a more 
detailed Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP), in which the objectives, tasks, 
and responsibilities for various departments and services were delineated.
12
 
The DHS and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also carried out 
various CVE activities. These chiefly included Community Awareness Brie-
fings (CABs) and Community Resilience Exercises (CREXs).
13
 However, 
implementation of the CVE plan proved to be complicated: the number of 
actors overseeing it was limited and there were insufficient resources.
14
  
9.3  A new focus on CVE 
CVE policy was once again given priority after the attacks in Boston in April 
2013 and the emergence of IS. Initially its focus was on three cities: Boston, 
Los Angeles and Minneapolis-St. Paul.
15
 These cities were chosen because 
of their relation to problems of jihadism, extremism and/or terrorism, and 
previous experience with community engagement.
16
 Minneapolis-St. Paul, in 
addition to New York and Chicago, were the cities most confronted with 
jihadism.
17
 According to the American government, Americans who had 




After some of these fighters had been killed by al-Shabaab itself, the authori-
ties in Minneapolis-St. Paul approached the Somali community as a partner 
to jointly prevent more young people from joining al-Shabaab. This created 
room for dialogue and changed the relationship between the police and the 
                                                          
10 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 6. CVE is a soft approach, focusing on addressing the causes of extremism. 
11 White House 2011a, p. 5-7. 
12 White House 2011b. 
13 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 6. 
14 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 1, 4. 
15 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 7. 
16 U.S. Department of Justice 2015. 
17 Mullins 2016, p. 282. 





 The existence of such relationships also played a role in the 
choice of Boston, which had already carried out activities in the realm of 
community engagement and community policing.
20
  
Similarly, in 2008 Los Angeles took the first initiatives to build trust be-
tween organisations and social actors to realise a whole of government and 
whole of community approach toward CVE.
21
 Under the banner of the Three 
City Pilot, these three cities worked on local CVE frameworks.
22
 As part of 
the new CVE agenda the FBI launched a website for students in 2016 called 
the Don’t be a Puppet-campaign. Through this online portal the FBI uses 
interactive programmes to inform students about (the risks of) extremism.
23
 
The three cities announced their plans in February 2015. Boston developed 
A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies, which identified 
seven problems and provided potential solutions.
24
 The Los Angeles Frame-
work for Countering Violent Extremism consisted of three cornerstones: pre-
vention, intervention, and interdiction. Prevention received the most atten-




Minneapolis-St. Paul introduced the Building Community Resilience plan, 
which mainly focused on the local Somali-American community, the largest 
in the US. Together with this community they identified causes of radicali-
sation, and these were dealt with through three pillars: engagement, preven-
tion, and intervention.
26
 Policy in Minneapolis-St. Paul had a strong empha-
sis on countering jihadist recruitment, and its pilot programme on the subject 
shared similarities with its anti-gang recruitment policies.
27
 
This new CVE approach and the national CVE strategy from 2011 were 
criticised for similar reasons as Prevent in the UK.
28
 Critics referred to the 
                                                          
19 Personal communication D. Gartenstein-Ross, counter-terrorism expert Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies and university lecturer at Georgetown University, 22 April 2016. 
20 Murphy 2014. 
21 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015. 
22 Vidino and Hughes 2015, p. 7. 
23 Federal Bureau of Investigation 2016. 
24 Greater Boston Regional Collaborative 2015. 
25 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015. 
26 N.N. 2015. 
27 Personal communication D. Gartenstein-Ross, counter-terrorism expert Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies and university lecturer at Georgetown University, 22 April 2016. 
28 See for instance: Price 2015; CAIR 2015; Hussain 2015; Kundnani 2015. 
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counter-productivity of the American approach because of its emphasis on 
law enforcement as well as its focus on Muslims. The interest group for 
Americans of Arab descent – the Arab American Institute – pointed out the 
stigmatising effect of CVE activities for Muslims, protesting that program-
mes for community outreach appeared to be used for security objectives.
29
 In 
July 2015, 42 human rights and community organisations asserted in an open 
letter to the House of Representatives that the obligation to report extremist 
behaviour and statements to the government restricts civil liberties.
30
 The 
letter also criticised the lack of scientific evidence for the assumptions that 
form the basis of the American CVE policy. 
9.4  Evaluation of CVE 
The CVE policy was evaluated in 2015 by eleven federal departments and 
institutions. Their evaluation identified four key needs: (1) better coordin-
ation and prioritisation of CVE activities, (2) clear responsibilities and clear 
communication between government bodies and with the population, (3) 
participation of ministries and services from outside the domain of national 
security and (4) a better assessment, distribution, and prioritisation of resour-
ces. A CVE Task Force was set up in January 2016 to implement the recom-
mendations.
31
 CVE projects subsidised through the CVE Grant Pro-gram 
were monitored by the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Science and Tech-
nology Directorate of the DHS evaluated such projects.  
Finally, the DoS published various reports on counter-terrorism policy, in 
which the number of victims before the implementation of a certain policy 




                                                          
29 See for example: Arab American Institute 2015. 
30 Brennan Center 2015.  
31 U.S. Department of Justice 2016. 
32 Adams, Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2011. 
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10  The Netherlands 
10.1  The national government and the issue of coordination 
Various government bodies at both the national and local level as well as 
non-governmental organisations are involved in dealing with jihadism. The 
ministries of Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and 
Security and Justice (V&J) play a leading role in the field of counter-terror-
ism and counter-radicalisation. The Minister of V&J is responsible for the 
coordination of counter-terrorism policy, while implementation is managed 
by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). 
Meanwhile the AIVD, under the authority of BZK, is the primary agency for 
collecting intelligence regarding (possible) risks to the democratic legal 
order. The National Police, which also resides under BZK, is responsible for 
arrests after the issue of an official notice by the AIVD.
1
 
Coordination between the above-mentioned bodies and other actors as part 
of countering terrorism has emerged as an important issue since the attacks 
on 11 September 2001. For instance, the theme of coordination was promin-
ent in a letter to the Parliament that accompanied the first package of coun-
ter-terrorism measures in October 2001 which mentioned that the measures 
spanned ‘various policy fields’.
2
 This package of measures also described 
the roles of other ministries with regard to countering terrorism, such as 




After the attacks in Madrid in 2004, further initiatives were taken to improve 
mutual coordination on political, policy, and operational levels. For this pur-
pose the Joint Counter-terrorism Committee (GCT) was established. It in-
cludes representatives from various ministries and government bodies, such 
as: V&J, BZK, General Affairs (AZ), Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, 
Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), Education, Culture and Science 
(OCW), the NCTV, the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the National Pol-
ice, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the Royal 
Military Constabulary (KMar), the Military Intelligence and Security Service 
                                                          
1 In Dutch: ‘ambtsbericht’. 
2 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2001, p. 2. 




(MIVD), and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND).
4
 The mini-
stries of SZW and OCW became involved in dealing with jihadism through 
the Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011.
5
 Another instan-
ce of institutional coordination is the Counter-terrorism Info-box (CT Info-
box), initiated in 2004. This partnership between ten government agencies 
aims to intensify the exchange of information about persons who, in the 
context of counter-terrorism, are considered a threat to Dutch society.
6
 
As stated previously, the NCTV has an important coordinating role. It was 
established as the National Counter-terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) in 2005, 
at the time under the shared responsibility of BZK and what was at the time 
the Ministry of Justice, with the latter responsible for coordination.
7
 One of 
the core tasks of the NCTV is to coordinate the implementation of the active-
ties concerning counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. The 
NCTV provides a link between politics and executive agencies, on both the 
national and local level.
8
 
The work of the NCTV at present includes a variety of tasks. This concerns 
drawing up threat analyses as well as the DTN, which are important for 
developing policy.
9
 Besides, the NCTV develops, adapts, and strengthens 
policy in the fields of counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalisation. 
Another responsibility is strengthening the resilience of infrastructure and 
vital sectors, which it accomplishes by linking various organisations within 
and outside the government (including business and science sectors) in order 
to increase knowledge about security. Protecting ‘vital interests and sectors 
and protecting persons, objects, and civil aviation’ is also a NCTV priority.
10
 
Finally, the NCTV links the (hard) criminal and socially-oriented (soft) ap-
proaches to terrorism and radicalisation through its coordinating role.
11
 
                                                          
4 Universiteit Utrecht 2016, p. 112. 
5 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2007b, p. 3. 
6 De Poot and Flight 2015, p. 10-11. 
7 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 2004b, p. 5, 7, 9-10. See also Bakker and De Roy van Zuijdewijn 
2015, p. 37. 
8 Universiteit Utrecht 2016, p. 126-127. 
9 See for more background information about the establishment and function of the DTN: Abels 2008; 
Bakker and De Roy van Zuijdewijn 2015. 
10 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid 2016. 
11 Abels 2012, p. 3. 
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10.2  The role of non-governmental organisations 
The Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan 2007-2011 made subsidies 
available to non-profit organisations for national projects ‘in the field of 
democratic development and conflict management for young people’.
12
 
Apart from government-funded projects, civil society organisations also 
started self-funded initiatives. For instance, in January 2015 the Alliance of 
Dutch Moroccans (SMN) started a telephone helpline which parents could 
call for advice concerning radicalisation; organisations can also make use of 
this service for questions about radicalisation. The details of these conver-
sations are not shared with third parties. Besides telephone support, the SMN 
deploys confidential advisers to support parents in dealing with radicali-
sation.
13
 Another such example is the project Oumnia works which was start-
ed by the non-profit organisation Steunpunt Sabr in The Hague to assist 
mothers in dealing with their radicalisation.
14
 
10.3  The role of municipalities 
At the municipal level, multiple actors work together to address radicali-
sation. The ‘person-oriented approach’ through case-by-case consultations is 
widely used by Dutch municipalities with regard to the prevention of radi-
calisation and those potentially travelling to as well as those returning from 
Syria/Iraq. Municipalities such as Amsterdam, Arnhem, Delft, The Hague, 
Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Zoetermeer have public policy plans 
concerning the prevention of radicalisation.
15
 The case consultations link 
several local government actors, in particular criminal law (police, the Public 
Prosecution Service, probation services) and the care sector. 
In several municipalities the link between criminal law and the care sector is 
institutionalised through the so-called Safety House. This is a networked 
entity through which actors from different work fields come together to deli-
berate and decide on interventions in complex cases. The Safety House, 
which dates back to the end of the 1990s, is also where the issue of radicali-
                                                          
12 N. N. 2012, p. 1. 
13 Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkaanse Nederlanders 2016. 
14 Stelma 2016; Steunpunt Sabr 2016. 
15 Gemeente Amsterdam 2016; Gemeente Arnhem 2016; Gemeente Delft 2015; Gemeente Delft 2016; 




sation is taken up.
16
 Not all municipalities make use of the Safety House. 
The municipality carries the final responsibility for public order and security 
at the local level and therefore remains the most important (coordinating) 
actor.  
Several municipalities have reporting and advice centres for first-line 
workers, so that social workers, teachers, and care providers have the opport-
unity to receive advice about radicalisation.
17
 In recent years, the police have 
been given a special task in confronting radicalisation. The community 
police officer is regarded as an important actor who detects signals of 
(possible) radicalisation at an early stage and passes them on to other rele-
vant social institutions or government services.  
Non-governmental actors are also involved at the local level for the 
prevention of radicalisation, including those active in the field of (youth) 
care. The degree and the way in which non-governmental actors are deploy-
ed vary for each municipality. In Rotterdam for instance, ‘social and volun-
tary organisations (…), such as Islamic and Jewish interest groups, mosques, 
centres of expertise regarding diversity, [and] self-organisations’ are invol-




                                                          
16 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2013, p. 7. 
17 See amongst others: Gemeente Amsterdam 2016; Gemeente Rotterdam 2016; Gemeente Maastricht 
2016.  
18 Gemeente Rotterdam 2015, p. 16. 
11  Belgium 
11.1  Federal policy coordination and implementation 
Counter-terrorism in Belgium is primarily the responsibility of intelligence 
services, although other governmental actors are increasingly involved as 
well.
1
 After the attacks on 11 September 2001, the Federal Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office and several specialised federal police forces were given a more 
central role.
2
 As a result of the earlier mentioned 12-Point Plan, the special 
protection assignment (with regard to visiting foreign heads of state) of the 
State Security Service (VSSE) was transferred to the federal police to allow 
for more capacity for intelligence collection.  
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office is authorised to carry out (national 
and international) criminal investigations into terrorism. It ensures the divi-
sion of tasks, cooperation, and coordination regarding terrorism cases. The 
public prosecutor brings together all parties involved in investigations and 
oversees their coordination. The parties involves are the decentralised dir-
ectorates of the Federal Judicial Police (FGP), the Central Unit Terrorism of 
the Federal Police and the intelligence agencies.
3
 
While these investigations are mainly carried out by decentralised directo-
rates, a unit within the Directorate of Countering Crime against Persons 
(DJP) has developed a programme for an integrated approach. The DJP 
coordinates various decentralised directorates. Besides acting as coordinator, 
the DJP also exchanges information with the Coordination Unit for Threat 
Analysis (OCAD, see below) and monitors suspected websites together with 
the Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU).
4
 In addition, several magistrates 
                                                          
1 Belgium has two intelligence services: the civil State Security Service (VSSE, under the authority of the 
Minister of Justice, sometimes also under the authority of the Minister of the Interior) and the military 
General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV, under the authority of the Minister of National 
Defence). Both services are supervised by the National Security Council. 
2 The term ‘specialised services’ refers to: The anti-terror service (OA3) of the Brussels Judicial Federal 
Police (PJF de Bruxelles) and the service ‘Terrorism and Sects’ of the central directorate of ‘Countering 
Crime Against Persons’ (DJP) of the Federal Judicial Police (FGP). See Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 
2007, p. 12-13; Federale Gerechtelijke Politie 2009, p. 5. 
3 The Dutch translation of Central Unit Terrorism is ‘Centrale dienst terrorisme’. 
4 Federale Gerechtelijke Politie 2009, p. 17. 
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and investigating judges have been appointed since 2006 to assist with the 
increase in the number of terrorism-related investigations.
5
 
Belgium established the OCAD in 2006 as the successor to the Mixed Anti-
Terrorist Group (AGG), which was itself established in secret in 1984 
following attacks in France and Belgium. The OCAD is an expansion of the 
AGG with the aim of more effective coordination of information. Whereas 
sharing information through the AGG was done on a voluntary basis, it 
became mandatory with the OCAD. This new structure of cooperation and 
information sharing includes besides the intelligence services and police also 




The OCAD produces threat analyses on the basis of information supplied by 
partner services.
7
 Beside long-term strategic analyses, the OCAD issues 
‘punctual’ threat analyses as well.
8
 These include general threat assessments 
applying to the whole of Belgium, but also analyses regarding specific per-
sons, groups, events, organisations, or infrastructure. With regard to specific 
persons, the OCAD determines the threat posed by all individuals it has 
listed as Foreign Terrorists Fighters (FTF).
9
 On the basis of these threat 
analyses, the OCAD determines the threat level for Belgium. The level of 
threat can differ locally, unlike in the Netherlands. As is the case with the 
intelligence services, the OCAD is controlled by Committee I. 
Besides tasks with regard to counter-terrorism, the OCAD coordinates the 
implementation of the previously mentioned Action Plan Radicalism or Plan 
R in its capacity as chair of the National Task Force (NTF), the action plan’s 
strategic steering committee.
10
 The NTF meets on a monthly basis and con-
sists of the Directorate-General for Security and Prevention Policy under of 
                                                          
5 Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 13. Magistrates work under the direction of the federal 
public prosecutor. The Belgian legal system has two types of magistrates: judges and public prosecutors 
(also referred to as federal prosecutors). The federal public prosecutor can call in an investigating judge 
when there is evidence for a crime. This judge carries out an investigation to determine whether further 
prosecution is required. The judge is authorised to hear witnesses and suspects, appoint experts, and 
recommend compulsory measures. The dossier will then be shared with the public prosecutor for 
further handling.  
6 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a terrorism unit since 2005 to coordinate information from Belgian 
embassies abroad and to supply this information to the OCAD. 
7 Delefortrie and Springael 2004; Coolsaet and Struye de Swielande 2007, p. 14. 
8 OCAD undated. 
9 OCAD undated; Clerix 2014. 
10 Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 11, 13. 
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the Federal Public Service (FOD) of the Interior, the Directorate-General of 
Penitentiary Institutions under the FOD of Justice, and the Public Prose-
cution Service.  
After the revision of Plan R in 2015 membership of the NTF was further ex-
tended with the federal public prosecutor, the federal police, the State 
Security Service (VSSE), the General Intelligence and Security Service of 
the Armed Forces (ADIV), the FOD of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate-
General Crisis Centre, the Permanent Commission of Local Police, the Cell 
for Financial Information Processing (CFI) and the Immigration Service. 
Each participating service coordinates information-gathering in its own field 
regarding seven topics: ideology and propaganda, cultural centres and non-
profit organisations, propaganda centres; websites and the Internet, radio and 
TV broadcasts, and networks and prisons. After analysis, data is stored in the 




The OCAD briefly had a federal Syria Task Force, which offered support to 
local authorities and supervised local coordination in terms of dealing with 
jihadists.
12
 This has now been taken over by 23 Local Task Forces (LTF).
13
 
These LTFs are kept informed by the OCAD about jihadists (possibly) 
travelling to or returning from Syria and Iraq. The LTFs assess which mea-
sures can be taken on a local level.
14
 The central counter-terrorism service of 
the Directorate-General for Judicial Police (DGJ) and Directorate of Admini-
strative Police Operations (DAO) support these LTFs.
15
 Measures on a local 
level are implemented by Local Integrated Security Cells (LIVC). 
The Directorate-General for Security and Prevention Policy, under the FOD 
of the Interior, coordinates federal prevention strategy. It established the 
Unit Radicalism (also referred to as the Unit R) in 2014, as proposed in the 
2013 federal prevention strategy. Unit R is responsible for the preparation, 
elaboration, and evaluation of security and prevention policy. Moreover, 
Unit R coordinates initiatives to prevent radicalisation and advises authori-
                                                          
11 Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 13. 
12 Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 13. 
13 This is organised at the level of the judicial districts. The following parties are represented: the local 
and federal police, the intelligence services, and the OCAD, possibly complemented with a 
representative of the local public prosecutor’s office. 
14 Clerix 2014. 
15 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken 2014. 
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ties about violent radicalisation and means to address it. Other response-
bilities of the unit include increasing scientific knowledge and expertise, and 
the training of (local) professionals.
16
 Unit R is a contact point for mayors 
who have questions about radicalisation or require professional help with 




11.2  Local and regional counter-radicalisation 
On the local level, mayors are requested to establish an LIVC in order to 
address the issue of radicalisation.
18
 The LIVC is the main component of the 
integrated approach at the local level to deal with jihadists travelling to or 
returning from Syria and Iraq. It is a multidisciplinary consultative platform 
in which the mayor, the local police, religious institutions, schools, (sports) 
associations, and social workers participate.
19
 These institutions not only 
focus on detecting radicalisation, but also on dealing with radicalisation, 
including the offering of follow-up care and rehabilitation to returnees. Local 
police shares relevant information from the LTF with the mayor, after which 
the LIVC takes measures.
20
  
Partnerships between local government and non-governmental actors in 
Mechelen and Maaseik show that not all civil society actors actually partici-
pate. This has to do with a lack of time or a desire to not be associated with 
confronting radicalisation. Besides, it has happened that an organisation with 
which young people are connected is not invited.
21
 Municipalities have 
different degrees of involvement as well, with lack of time being the most 
important factor. As a result, these less involved municipalities also have 
less impact on policymaking. Often the opportunity to obtain additional 
funding from the federal government impact the degree to which munici-
palities may focus on strategies for the prevention of radicalisation. 
Municipalities who, due to the extra funding, can specifically dedicate a civil 
servant to anti-radicalisation policy can participate in consultative platforms 
                                                          
16 FOD Binnenlandse Zaken 2015, p. 10. 
17 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
18 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken and Minister van Justitie 2015. 
19 Vincke et. al. 2016, p. 13. 
20 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2016. 
21 Souffriau 2015. 
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more adequately compared to municipalities where the tasks of anti-radicali-
sation are added to a civil servant’s existing workload.
22
 
In addition, the 2013 Prevention Programme Violent Radicalisation includes 
responsibilities for local non-governmental actors. Civil society is requested 
to (continue) to invest in fostering the participation of individuals from all 
sections of society. The federal government also wants to stimulate projects 
from these partners – whether they are carried out in conjunction with the 
federal government or not – to strengthen the resilience of young people, to 
teach democratic values, to provide counter-arguments, and to disseminate 
information on the risks of radicalism.
23
 An example of this is the (educa-
tional) network of Islam experts. At the request of the Flemish Minister of 
Education, this network started to visit schools in Flanders to explain Islam 
and radicalisation, in order to start a counter-narrative.
24  
   
                                                          
22 Personal communication M. Dewaele, radicalisation project team employee VVSG, 10 June 2016. 
23 Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken 2013, p. 16. 
24 See for example: Vlaanderen undated. 
12  Denmark 
12.1  Operational and local coordination 
Denmark has also pursued improving coordination between government ser-
vices. The 2005 Action Plan recommended to establish a Centre for Terror 
Analysis.
1
 This centre, which opened in 2007, is comprised of fifteen em-
ployees from the PET, FE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Agency 
for Crisis Management, who are rotated and serve on a temporary basis.
2
 The 
Centre aims to ensure an optimal exchange of information between the 
institutions involved. In addition, the Centre draws up strategic analyses and 
threat analyses, covering both the threat of terrorism in Denmark and the 
threat against Danish interests abroad.
3
 
Danish policy regarding radicalisation has since its inception – the 2007 
initiatives in Aarhus – been embedded in existing structures dealing with 
crime prevention. Since the 1970s Denmark has built partnerships on a local 
level between schools, social services, and the police (the so-called SSP), 
which are aimed at preventing and dealing with youth crime. This coopera-
tion and sharing of information has been legally institutionalised, including 
the guarantee that SSP information may not be used in criminal investi-
gations.
4
 The parties involved come together when there is a reason for 
concern about an individual and assess the kind of help that is needed. At 
first the system was controversial, because it was regarded as a way to 
inform on someone, but it has become fully commonplace.
5
  
The strategy for dealing with radicalisation through so-called Info-houses 
proceeds according to the same principle. It is a regional partnership be-
tween the police, municipality, and social services. Signs of radicalisation 
are gathered and discussed via this platform, and together the actors deter-
mine what approach is required. For instance, they may determine whether a 
                                                          
1 Statsministeriet 2005, p. 5; Persson 2013, p. 23-24. 
2 The agency for crisis management (‘Beredskabsstyrelsen’) resides under the authority of the Ministry 
of Defence and focuses on dealing with the consequences of major accidents and calamities. The agency 
is also responsible for the Danish Fire Service. See Beredskabsstryrelsen 2016. 
3 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2016. 
4 Justitsministeriet 2015. 
5 Personal communication with Danish counter-terrorism expert, 12 April 2016. 
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situation could be handled by a social worker or a mentor, or whether the 
PET must become involved.
6
 
12.2  Ministerial coordination 
Within the PET, the Centre for Prevention has been responsible for dealing 
with radicalisation. They engage with individuals whom the PET thinks pose 
a threat to society and also with individuals who have been sentenced for 
violent extremism or terrorism. Besides, the Centre for Prevention trains, 
advises, and supervises first-line workers (police, social services, psychiatry, 
and probation services). Finally, the Centre maintains contact with indivi-
duals and social institutions that may play a role in reducing radicalisation.
7
 
As such the Centre links local and national approaches and oversees their 
coordination. 
The Centre shares this role of coordinating body with the Agency for Inter-
national Recruitment and Integration (SIRI), a part of the Ministry of 
Immigration, Integration, and Public Housing.
8
 SIRI largely has the same 
tasks as the Centre: aside from coordination, they also provide training, advi-
ce, and supervision, though with a slightly different emphasis. For example, 
SIRI offers support to municipalities and the police in cases of recruitment 
and when individuals leave extremist groups. SIRI also spreads knowledge 
and promotes awareness by publishing a (multilingual) pamphlet under the 
title ‘Are you afraid that your son or daughter is heading for Syria?’ SIRI 
also makes possible the training and deployment of mentors and coaches, so 
they may assist parents and family members dealing with processes of 
radicalisation.
9
 This system of coaches and mentors is regarded as a crucial 
part of Danish counter-radicalisation strategy. The idea is that those actors 
who know best about persons at risk of radicalisation and who are able to 
gain their confidence may play an important role in dealing with radicali-
sation. 
  
                                                          
6 Hemmingsen 2015, p. 27-28.  
7 Politiets Efterretningstjeneste 2014, p. 15. 
8 Denmark has had a ministry that deals with integration since 2001. 
9 Udlændinge-, Integrations- og Boligministeriet 2016. 
13  Germany 
13.1  A crowded scene 
In Germany the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal 
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are responsible for coun-
ter-terrorism with regard to internal security. Both institutions reside under 
the Ministry of the Interior (BMI). The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) 
and the Military Counter-intelligence Service (MAD) amongst others, are 
responsible for the timely identification of foreign (terrorist) threats.
1
 The 
BND reports to the Federal Chancellery – the executive office of the 
Chancellor – while the MAD reports to the Ministry of Defence. These ser-
vices represent the federal level. However, the sixteen federal states are 
primarily responsible for public order and security. Only in specific circum-
stances – domestic implications of international terrorism – do the BKA and 
BfV play a role.
2
 Each federal state therefore has its own criminal police 
(LKA) and security service (LfV). 
The division of competences between the federal and state level is based on 
restraint towards a centralised police force, in view of past experiences with 
the Gestapo and Stasi.
3
 Until an amendment to the Constitution in 2008, the 
role of the BKA was limited, for example, to supporting federal states with 
police tasks; the amendment allowed the BKA to act in cases of international 
terrorism when, amongst others, the danger exceeded the individual state 
level. An independent investigation by the BKA on (preventing) internatio-
nal terrorism required permission from the federal states. The effectiveness 
of federal and state police and security services in countering terrorism is 
still negatively affected by competition about the division of responsibilities 
between the federal and state level.
4
 It must be noted, however, that there has 
been some improvement in recent years. 
                                                          
1 Germany has a so-called ‘Trennungsgebot’, whereby the constitution regards police tasks and security 
tasks as separate activities. Hellmuth 2016, p. 97, mentions that there has been a discussion about 
whether this separation in the constitution only has an organisational nature or also a constitutional 
nature. 
2 Deutscher Bundestag 2011c, p. 3. 
3 Hellmuth 2016, p. 96. 
4 Hellmuth 2016, p. 91-92. 
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13.2  Coordination  
The attacks in Madrid in 2004 provided the occasion for Germany to im-
prove mutual cooperation between the various police and security services. 
The Joint Counter-terrorism Centre (GTAZ) was founded in December 
2004. This is not an independent body, but a cooperation and communication 
platform of no less than 40 bodies that are involved in maintaining national 
security. GTAZ also has an analytical component, drawing up threat analy-
ses and strategic analyses with regard to international terrorism.
5
 
Besides the federal and state police and intelligence services, GTAZ also 
includes the MAD, the Federal Office for Refugees (BAMF), the federal 
prosecutor, the criminal investigation unit of the customs department, and 
the federal police.
6
 GTAZ is primarily dedicated to tackling ‘Islamist 
Terrorism’.
7
 After the violent acts of the National-Socialist Underground 
Party (NSU) a similar body for cooperation and the exchange of information 
was established for right-wing extremism.
8
 
13.3  De-radicalisation and the role of non-governmental organisations  
At the federal level various entities are involved in the prevention of radi-
calisation. The intelligence and security services established in 2009 a Work-
ing group Deradicalisation within GTAZ in order to play a greater role in 
preventing jihadism and supporting de-radicalisation.
9
 This Working group 
examines (the development of) jihadist ideologies, identifies radicalisation at 
an early stage, identifies possibilities to remain in contact with radicalising 
individuals, and offers support and assistance to the community (family and 
friends) of the radicalising person.
10
  
                                                          
5 Persson 2013, p. 26. 
6 In view of the ‘Trennungsgebot’, the activities of police services and intelligence services are strictly 
separated in an institutional sense as part of GTAZ. The staff of both services meet in various working 
groups; see Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2016a. Federal prosecutor (‘Generalbundesanwalt’), 
criminal investigation unit of the customs department (‘Zollkriminalamt’) and the federal police 
(‘Bundespolizei’). 
7 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2016a. 
8 Initially this was the ʽGemeinsame Abwehrzentrum gegen Rechtsextremismus/Terrorismusʼ (GAR), 
which started in December 2011. In November 2012 it was given a new name, ʽGemeinsames 
Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrumʼ (GETZ), and a broader area of attention: extremism and 
terrorism from the left, xenophobia, counterintelligence and counterproliferation, see Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz 2016b.   
9 Endres 2014, p. 4. 
10 Endres 2014, p. 4-5. 
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The BAMF, also a participant in GTAZ, plays a significant role with regard 
to the last theme of supporting and assisting the community of the radi-
calising person. The BAMF operates under the BMI and deals with asylum 
procedures, and also stimulates and coordinates the integration of migrants.
11
 
The BAMF also includes since 2012 an advice centre about the prevention 
of radicalisation, in particular with regard to ‘Islamist groups’.
12
 This 
includes a hotline for persons seeking assistance in dealing with radicalising 
individuals. The hotline guarantees the anonymity of the caller under certain 
circumstances; however, this anonymity may be set aside if security is at 
stake and authorities have to be called in.
13
  
The BAMF also maintains contact with social institutions that offer assi-
stance for de-radicalisation. One of these institutions is HAYAT-Deutsch-
land, which was the first institution in Germany in 2011 to offer programmes 
for the community (parents, friends, teachers, and employers) and the 
individual in the process of radicalisation him/herself.
14
 HAYAT-Deutsch-
land has been operating in the vicinity of Berlin and East Germany and is 
part of the ZDK Gesellschaft Demokratische Kultur. This latter institution 
started with EXIT-Deutschland in 2000, a programme for individuals wish-
ing to break with right-wing extremism.
15
  
The initiatives for preventing radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Ger-
many are generally closely related to the approach to extremism as discussed 
in Part One. This includes its organisation in terms of specific cooperation 
and coordination between the authorities and social institutions as well as the 
applied methods. 
  
                                                          
11 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016a. 
12 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016b. 
13 Endres 2014, p. 8. 
14 HAYAT-Deutschland 2016. See Endres 2014, p. 7 for a summary of other social institutions which offer 
comparable programmes. 
15 EXIT Deutschland 2016. 
14  France 
14.1  The investigating magistrate as a new actor 
French counter-terrorism policy has been primarily handled by the police 
and judicial authorities since the mid-1980s. The moment of intervention is 
determined by an (imminent) breach of the law, on the basis of information 
from intelligence services. This is a substantial change compared to previous 
decades, when foreign policy considerations had a strong influence, espe-
cially in terms of dealing with international terrorism. The idea was that the 
best way to safeguard the country from attacks was for France to adopt as 
neutral a position as possible on issues related to foreign terrorist groups.
1
 
The emphasis on diplomacy as a tool to counter terrorism petered out in the 
mid-1980s, when the French authorities were not able to immediately deal 
with a series of bomb attacks. This raised questions on how the country 
should deal with terrorism.
2
 The 1986 legislative amendment tasked parti-
cular investigative magistrates with investigating terrorist acts. This further 
gave shape to a criminal approach to countering terrorism, with the investi-
gating magistrate occupying a prominent position. Cases concerning coun-
ter-terrorism are passed on to the investigating magistrate by local prose-
cutors who tend decides whether the perpetrators should be prosecuted or 
not.
3
 As such, the work of the investigating magistrate is located in between 
a federal prosecutor and a lawyer. 
The magistrates can initiate a judicial investigation and order the searching 
of premises, wiretapping, and serving of summons. In practice they work 
closely with the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST), which is one 
of the domestic intelligence services (see more about the reorganisation of 
these services under the heading Coordination). The actual prosecution of 
                                                          
1 Shapiro and Suzan 2003, p. 69-70. 
2 This episode in the French history of counter-terrorism has been controversial for a long time (and 
perhaps still is), because of the suggestion that the bomb attacks ended as a result of the political 
agreement between France and Syria and Iran as instigators of the violence. See Shapiro and Suzan 
2003, p. 74. 
3 The French name of these judges is ‘juge d’instruction’ and the position is a general part of the French 
legal system. See E-Justice 2016. 
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perpetrators is done by a regular district court.
4
 It is argued that the system of 
investigative magistrates has a depolitising effect. The decision about the 
nature and approach to particular acts of violence is placed beyond politics 
since it is the investigative magistrate who decides whether or not the 
offenders should be prosecuted. However, the system has also been criticised 
for lack of supervision of the work of the magistrates.
5
 
14.2  Coordination 
From the mid-1980s onwards efforts were made to promote cooperation and 
the sharing of information with regard to countering terrorism. UCLAT has 
been active since 1984 in stimulating the sharing of operational information. 
One level above UCLAT is the Inter-Ministerial Counter-terrorism Com-
mittee (CILAT), an body that coordinates policy measures.
6
 After the attacks 
on 11 September 2001, President Jacques Chirac appointed a ‘Monsieur 
sécurité’, a presidential adviser, to strengthen supervision and coordination 
in the field of security and counter-terrorism.
7
 In 2002, the President recon-
vened the inactive domestic security council (CSI). Chaired by the President, 
this council focused on improving interdepartmental coordination on an even 
higher level than CILAT. The CSI’s powers were expanded in 2007 by 
merging it with the French defence council, creating a new council for 




There is also a council for domestic intelligence (CRI), which since 2004 has 
aimed to improve the coherence of the activities of the domestic intelligence 
services, the DST and the Central Directorate of General Intelligence 
(DCRG), and of the police services (Judicial Police (PJ) and the National 
Gendarmerie). The CRI became superfluous in 2008 as a result of the merger 
that year of the DST and the DGRC into the Central Directorate of General 
Intelligence (DCRI). The DCRI changed into General Directorate of Domes-
                                                          
4 In France the court of assizes (‘cour d’assises’) has jurisdiction over serious crimes, which also includes 
terrorism. Normally speaking this court consists of three judges and six jury members (citizens), however 
with terrorism cases there are no jury members. See E-Justice 2016. 
5 Shapiro 2007, p. 138-139, 145-146, 148, 155. 
6 The high officials (‘directeurs de cabinet’) of the President, the Prime Minister, and the ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Overseas Territories, and Defence participate in this, as well as the police, gendarmerie, 
and the UCLAT. See Bigo 2006, p. 13.  
7 Hellmuth 2016, p. 201-202. 
8 Hellmuth 2016, p. 202-203. Besides the President, the CSI consists of the Prime Minister, as well as the 
ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, Budget, and Economy and Finance. 
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tic Security (DGSI) in 2012.
9
 This created more clarity. Additionally the 
prison system’s intelligence service, established in 2003 to identify and 
monitor radicalisation among prisoners, started to share information with 
other intelligence services after the attack by Merah in 2012.
10
 
There are two notable aspects regarding these attempts to improve coor-
dination between the various ministries and services. First of all, the greater 
role played by the President in the domain of national security (‘Monsieur 
sécurité’, the CRI, and the CDSN), which was traditionally the Prime Mini-
ster’s responsibility, demonstrated a centralisation towards the executive 
power.
11
 Secondly, the Feneche committee’s recommendation that a further 
streamlining of the work of the intelligence services was necessary after the 
two major attacks in Paris in 2015, which in light of the earlier mentioned 
developments that concerned the restructuring of security agencies, was 
perhaps not a surprising conclusion.
12
 
14.3  Lower administrative levels and the separation of church and state 
Measures have also been taken on lower administrative levels to address 
‘radical Islam’. This has been done on a regional level since 2005, carried 
out by units consisting of various government services (tax, police, ‘préfec-
ture’, and animal health). These units visit institutions suspected of activities 
related to ‘radical Islam’ and carry out inspections monitoring compliance 
with rules and regulations.
13
 This is an expression of counter-terrorism pol-
icy that focuses on the violation of the law, as described in the previous 
chapter about France.  
Additionally, the strict French view on separation of church and state (‘laï-
cité’) means that the presence of religion and as such the participation of 
religious institutes in the public domain as a partner in addressing radicali-
sation is unlikely. The practice of community policing, which is much more 
common in the Netherlands and the UK, shall be more difficult to apply in 
France.
14
 Nevertheless, there are contacts between intelligence services and 
representatives of particular religious communities, but these contacts are 
                                                          
9 Hellmuth 2015, p. 984. 
10 Hellmuth 2015, p. 990. 
11 Hellmuth 2015, p. 985. 
12 Sanderson 2016. 
13 Ragazzi 2014, p. 28. The ‘préfet’ is the representative of the Ministry of the Interior on a local level. 





 The French government does have an indirect influence on the 
desirability of certain religious movements. For instance, when French citi-
zenship is granted or a permit to build a mosque is issued, it requires the 
approval of the intelligence services.
16
  
The practice of laïcité restricts the formal involvement of social actors, such 
as religious institutes, in participating in counter-terrorism at an early stage. 
At the same time, according to reports in the media the French strategy for 
de-radicalisation is still in its initial phase.
17
 In light of the novelty of anti-
radicalisation in France and recognising the strict separation of church and 
state, it is still unclear how anti-radicalisation efforts will develop. The 2016 
plan includes references to education, sports clubs, and interregional teams 
for offering support to persons who are radicalising, and training persons to 
make contact with populations who are vulnerable to radicalisation.
18
 It is 
still uncertain which institutions or government services will play a role in 
dealing with radicalisation. For example, most employees of the telephone 




                                                          
15 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10. 
16 Ragazzi 2014, p. 10. 
17 See for example Renout 2016. 
18 Premier Ministre 2016, p. 7-8. 
19 Hellmuth 2015, p. 988. 
15  United Kingdom 
15.1  From threat to policy 
Various government bodies play a role in determining CONTEST policy. 
Threats are assessed by means of confidential analyses prepared by the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). This partnership was established in 2003 
and is based at the headquarters of the Security Service (MI5) in London. 
JTAC analyses national and international intelligence, establishes threat 
levels, and informs ministries and government services about terrorist thre-
ats. The agency also produces reports on inter alia terrorism-related develop-
ments and terrorist networks.
1
 The confidential JTAC analyses are an impor-
tant input for the annual National Risk Assessment. On the basis of this 
assessment the British government formulates objectives for each of the four 
CONTEST workstreams.  
The National Security Council is periodically informed about the progress of 
policy implementation. This council consists of ministers, headed by the 
Prime Minister, and was set up in 2010 to oversee all matters relating to 
national security, intelligence and defence. The OSCT, which falls under the 
Home Office, is responsible for coordinating CONTEST. The Extremism 
Task Force of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating counter-
extremism efforts. 
Aside from the coordination of CONTEST, the OSCT played a leading role 
in the creation of the 2011 CONTEST strategy. In this regard, the OSCT was 
assisted by the ministries, the Devolved Administrations, the police, and the 
intelligence services – which are all engaged in the strategy’s implemen-
tation as well. Since 2010 the Home Office has consulted the broader public 
about specific themes within CONTEST. Thus far, this has occurred six 
times and included a three-month consultation process for the new Prevent 
strategy, which started in November 2010. The consultations in the form of 
meetings, focus groups, and an online survey included the views of local 
authorities, religious communities, and students. Despite these measures, the 
                                                          
1 Persson 2013, p. 27. 
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strategy has been criticised because of the minor role of the Muslim 
community in its implementation.
2
  
15.2  Pursue, Protect and Prepare 
The implementation of counter-terrorism policy involves many different 
government actors. The Intelligence services, police services, and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) play a central role. The UK’s three main intelli-
gence services are the Security Service (or MI5), the Secret Intelligence Ser-
vice (or MI6), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
MI6 and GCHQ operate under the responsibility of the Foreign & Common-
wealth Office.  
MI5, designated as the leading intelligence service after the Cold War in the 
field of counter-terrorism, focuses on domestic threats. The earlier discussed 
JTAC was set up in 2003 for the purposes of more efficient coordination 
between MI5, MI6, GCHQ, Defence Intelligence (DI), the Foreign & Com-
monwealth Office, and the police. MI5 closely cooperates with the main 
police service in the region of London which gathers intelligence and has 
counter-terrorism responsibilities: the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC, 
also referred to as SO15) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
3
 The 
operational activities of the MPS are linked to regional and national police 
networks through the Police Counter-Terrorism Network (PCTN).
4
  
In the context of the Pursue workstream, the above-mentioned intelligence 
and security agencies focus on investigating terrorist activities and disrupting 
threats, while the CPS is responsible for prosecution. In addition, the police 
and intelligence services, together with the National Offender Management 
Service (NOMS) of the Ministry of Justice, examine the risks posed by per-
sons sentenced for terrorists offences.
5
 The National Counter-Terrorism 
Security Office (NaCTSO), part of the National Police Chiefs’ Council 
(NPCC), supports a network of about 190 counter-terrorism advisors (CT-
                                                          
2 Skoczylis 2015; Ganesh 2015. 
3 The CTC/SO15 is a merger between the Special Branch (SO12) and Anti-Terrorism Branch (SO13). 
4 HM Government 2011a, p. 115. 
5 HM Government 2011a, p. 123. In England and Wales the NOMS is responsible for rehabilitation 
programmes and the functioning of prisons. The NOMS also supervises rehabilitation. See: National 
Offender Management Service undated. 
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SA) who are part of local police units. Their task is providing assistance in 
all fields of Protect and Prepare.
6
  
Besides government bodies, non-governmental actors are also involved in 
the implementation of counter-terrorism policy. There have been several 
changes in this area in recent years, in particular with regard to the Protect 
workstream. In the first public version of CONTEST, published in 2006, the 
role of non-governmental actors was limited to public-private cooperation in 
protecting critical infrastructure (Critical National Infrastructure, CNI).
7
 
However, the annual CONTEST report from 2015 mentions cooperation 
with actors in domains as diverse as the communications sector, the Internet, 
infrastructure and CNI, science and technology, and volunteer organi-
sations.
8
 Examples of such collaboration are the Griffin Project and the 
ARGUS Project. In these projects, managers, reception and security staff are 
informed about terrorism-related issues and given training in preventing, 
responding and recovering from an attack. These projects also aim to build 
confidence and share information about terrorism and crime. 
The government took additional steps to strengthen its relationship with the 
private sector in 2014 following the publication of the National Security 
Through Technology policy report.
9
 This included establishing the Security 
and Resilience Growth Partnership (SRGP), the Security Innovation and 
Demonstration Centre (SIDC), and a new position within the OSCT: the 
Director of Security Industry Engagement.
10
 With the creation of the latter 




15.3  Prevent 
Prevent policies are primarily implemented at the local level in prisons, 
schools, and neighbourhoods.
12
 The organisation of Prevent is comparable to 
the UK’s Crime Safety Partnerships (CSP).
13
 Prevent builds on a similar 
structure, in which policies are implemented by multiple actors, including 
                                                          
6 HM Government undated. 
7 HM Government 2006, p. 24; Rosemont 2014, p. 148. 
8 HM Government 2015; Rosemont 2014, p. 148. 
9 Ministry of Defence 2012. 
10 For more information see: Home Office undated. 
11 Rosemont 2014, p. 149. 
12 HM Government 2011a, p. 112. 
13 Skoczylis 2015. 
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the police, social workers, religious communities, educational institutions, 
probation services, and prisons. A network of coordinators supervises the 
work of these actors and supports the activities of Prevent. There are two 
types of Prevent coordinators. The first type is a Home Office official who 
assists the local government in creating and implementing action plans. The 
second type assists educational institutions and offers training courses.
14
 
The police are basically the public face of Prevent via the use of Prevent 
Engagement Officers (PEO).
15
 These PEOs support the network of coordina-
tors, visit neighbourhoods, and disseminate information on various topics to 
other Prevent partners (e.g. on political tensions between neighbour-
hoods).
16
 The PEOs are an important means by which (local) actors are link-
ed together. Police also plays a central role in the Channel programme, a 
cornerstone of Prevent. They coordinate the activities of an interdisciplinary 
network of actors which is designed to support individuals who are referred 
to Channel. In this network, the local government is always involved. 
Depending on the case, the National Health Service (NHS), social workers, 
educational institutions, youth crime services, the Home Office, Troubled 




Communities play an important role within Prevent. The government states 
that communities can often refute extremist narratives more adequately than 
the government itself.
18
 However, studies from 2009 and 2010 showed 
mixed results in terms of the degree to which the authorities draw on the 
capacities of communities. Local authorities proved selective in initiating 
dialogue with individuals or organisations representing communities. Local 
authorities also took decisions regarding Prevent without consulting or 
otherwise involving communities or other local non-governmental actors.
19
 
One reason given for sidestepping these actors was that they lacked 
sufficient resources and expertise.
20
 This is not the only sign of friction 
                                                          
14 Mastroe 2016, p. 53. 
15 Lakhani 2012, p. 192. 
16 HM Government 2011a, p. 70. 
17 HM Government 2015c, p. 7. The national Troubled Families programme was launched in 2011. A 
Troubled Families Team supports local authorities through interventions and support to families. These 
teams fall under the responsibility of the DCLG. 
18 HM Government 2011b, p. 7. 
19 Briggs 2010, p. 976-977; Kundnani 2009, p. 15-17. 
20 Briggs 2010, p. 977. 
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between the authorities and communities in the context of Prevent. Recent 
reports showed that less than ten percent of all references to Channel came 
from communities. Most of these references came from schools, welfare 
institutions, and the health care sector.
21
 The choice for particular Prevent 
partners also caused controversy. Then Home Secretary Theresa May stated 
in the introduction to the new Prevent strategy in 2011 that certain organi-
sations should not have been subsidised but taken action against.
22 
  
                                                          
21 Hamilton 2015. 
22 HM Government 2011b, p. 1. 
16  United States 
16.1  Policy development 
The federal government developed both the national counter-terrorism stra-
tegy and the national CVE strategy without the involvement of non-govern-
mental actors. For instance, the national CVE strategy was crafted by an 
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), whereby White House officials re-
sponsible for national security played a leading role. The strategy was then 
discussed with and approved by the DoS, DoJ, DHS, the departments of 
Finance, Justice, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, 
and Veterans’ Affairs as well as the FBI and NCTC, and finally signed by 
the President.
1
 Different procedures were followed on the local level. The 
strategies developed as part of the Three City Pilot were the outcome of 
rounds of consultation involving both state and non-governmental actors. 
This included the Muslim communities in each of the three cities.  
16.2  Counter-terrorism: Coordination and implementation  
President Bush announced the establishment of the Office of Homeland 
Security (OHS) following the attacks on 11 September 2001 The OHS was 
replaced by the DHS with the 2002 Homeland Security Act. More than 
twenty federal institutions who dealt with homeland security became part of 
this new department. The department’s objectives were to improve coordin-
ation and cooperation between the various government services and to 
prevent new attacks.
2
 The key tasks of the department mainly concern coun-
ter-terrorism.
3
 Despite the concentration of government services on home-
land security into one department, the DHS is not solely responsible for 
security and counter-terrorism.
4
 Other important actors which will be 
explained below are the DoS and the DoJ. 
Part One already briefly discussed the Office for Combatting Terrorism, 
which had been created within the DoJ after the hostage-taking in Munich in 
1972. This office, which is now known as the Bureau of Counterterrorism 
                                                          
1 White House 2011b. 
2 Nemeth 2010. 
3 Clarke 2004, p. 119. 
4 Clarke 2004, p. 125. 
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and Countering Violent Extremism, is responsible for developing and coor-
dinating counter-terrorism initiatives against threats from abroad. The DoS 
houses the Global Engagement Center, which was known as the Center for 
Strategic Counter-Terrorism Communications before 2016. This centre is 
responsible for communicating CVE to a global audience, and coordinates, 
integrates, and synchronises information to refute propaganda from organi-
sations such as IS and Al Qaida, whereby offering an alternative narrative.
5
 
DoJ’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) is responsible for the development 
and implementation of legislation and policy regarding both domestic and 
international terrorism.
6
 The DoJ is also involved in counter-terrorism via 
the FBI, which coordinates the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The 
JTTFs are networks of law enforcement agencies conducting counter-
terrorism investigations and sharing this information with partners.
7
 A com-
parable function is undertaken by the fusion centers, which fall under the 
shared responsibility of the DoJ and the DHS. A fusion center shares infor-
mation between various levels in intelligence and law enforcement circles as 




The DHS, the DoS, and the FBI are part of the so-called Intelligence Com-
munity (IC) which totals seventeen services.
9
 This includes the NCTC, a part 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which 
promotes coherence within the IC. The NCTC is the successor to the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which was established in 2003 in 
response to the 9/11 Commission Report.
10
  
The NCTC, another member of the IC, is a collaboration between various 
actors, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI. In this 
capacity the NCTC is responsible for preparing terrorism-related analyses 
and advising the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) about intelligence 
                                                          
5 U.S. Department of State 2016b. 
6 U.S. Department of Justice undated. 
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security undated b. 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice 2006, p. 17. 
9 The 14 other members are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast 
Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence, and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. 
10 For the report, see: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004. 
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operations and analyses concerning counter-terrorism. This makes the NCTC 
the primary agency to combine and analyse intelligence in the field of 
counter-terrorism (with the exception of domestic terrorism).
11
 The agency 
gathers and integrates information from the entire IC and prepares analyses 
on the basis of this information, which are offered to policymakers, police, 
intelligence, and defence agencies as well as agencies concerned with 
homeland security and foreign affairs.
12
 The general public is informed thro-
ugh the NTAS system of the DHS as referred to in Part One. 
16.3  CVE: Coordination and implementation 
A number of federal agencies involved in counter-terrorism policy also play 
an important role with regard to CVE. Responsibility for the coordination of 
the CVE strategy at the national level falls to the National Task Force. It was 
established in November 2010 and is managed by the DHS and the DoJ. All 
federal departments and federal agencies involved in community engage-
ment are represented in this task force, and the federal government adopts 
the role of facilitator and contact point for local authorities and local net-
works. 
Important on the government side are federal public prosecutors (US Attor-
neys), the FBI, the DoJ’s Civil Rights Division and the Community Rela-
tions Service, and the DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
(OCRL). The US government recognises that cooperation with communities, 
the private sector, and citizens is an essential part of CVE.
13
 However, it 
remains unclear what concrete roles these non-governmental actors should 
have with regard to the conduct of CVE. 
The (federal) government also supports and coordinates with regard to the 
local strategies of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles. The DoJ 
supervises the entire CVE pilot programme. The federal public prosecutors 
from the states of Minnesota, Massachusetts, and California do this for 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles respectively. These pro-
grammes are also undertaken in cooperation with the White House, the DHS 
                                                          
11 National Counter-terrorism Center undated a. The FBI is the primary organisation responsible for 
domestic terrorism. See: Rosenbach 2009. 
12 Examples of such analyses are the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the daily National Terrorism 
Bulletin (NTB). 





 These actors coordinate policy at the federal level and are 
in direct contact with local security services and communities through the 
above-mentioned CAB and CREX instruments.
15
 Similar to the national 
CVE approach, the federal government focuses in particular on supporting 
these communities so that they are able to respond more adequately to the 
needs of individuals and families.
16
 
In order to improve the coordination of the CVE approach by the DHS it was 
announced that the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) would be 
launched in September 2015. The aim of the OCP is to assist both public and 
private actors regarding CVE through coordination, innovation, and support 
(for example, through finance and training). At the same time the OCP tries 
to build trust and working relationships between the government and 
communities. To accomplish this, the OCP works together with the OCRL. 
Additionally, the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force was set up in 
January 2016 to further develop coordination. Executive government bodies 
participate in this task force under the chairmanship of the DHS and the DoJ 
in order to offer more efficient support on a local level for CVE.
17
 The task 
force focuses on the four key needs, as identified in the 2015 evaluation and 
as described in Part One. 
The local plans of the Three City Pilot show that local non-governmental 
actors should play an essential role in implementing CVE policy. Networks 
of governmental and non-governmental actors are seen as a way to increase 
resilience against extremism. Such forms of engagement between the various 
actors appear to be initiated by the government. But activities are also 
carried out by the local communities themselves, such as projects aimed at 
promoting the participation of people in society. While these projects are not 
by definition referred to as CVE, they are in line with the CVE agenda.  
Other activities by these local actors are specifically aimed at CVE, such as 
projects to increase awareness regarding extremism and recruitment.
18
 In 
particular institutions for (higher) education, experts and (representatives of) 
Muslim communities are given roles as part of CVE. In the plans of Los 
                                                          
14 Murphy 2014. 
15 National Counter-terrorism Center undated b. 
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security undated c. 
17 U.S. Department of Justice 2016. 
18 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015. 
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Angeles and Boston the private sector is also mentioned as a partner. This 
partner concerns in particular the media, which is seen as being able to 
increase the reach of narratives, and educational institutions for improving 
the skills of young people.
19  
                                                          
19 Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group 2015; U.S. Greater Boston Regional Collaborative 2015. 
17  Conclusion 
Counter-terrorism, in particular the focus on dealing with jihadism, has be-
come an important domain of policymaking in the years since the 11 Sep-
tember 2001 attacks in all of the seven countries investigated for this report. 
Besides this similarity, there are also many differences among the countries, 
and counter-terrorism – as an area of policymaking – is very much in mo-
tion. The dynamics of the policy field are greatly influenced by (the threat 
of) attacks and the respective political, institutional, and social contexts. The 
boundaries of this field are also not fixed. For one country, dealing with 
jihadism is more encompassing than for another country. 
The three most important developments signalled in this research are:  
 The increasing visibility of the policy domain; 
 The increase in coordination of policy and information sharing; 
 An increased focus on radicalisation and a further broadening of policy.  
The latter development is that in which counter-terrorism has most distin-
guished itself in the last ten years or so, compared with previous decades. 
Before exploring these developments in more detail, we present several 
general observations about how the different countries deal with jihadism. 
17.1  General observations 
In order to explain the developments with regard to counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation focused on jihadism in this concluding chapter, we 
have provided summaries in tables 2 and 3 on pages 98-101. In these figures, 
the countries have been placed below each other in the left column. In table 
2, the columns show in what year plans were announced for each country, 
whether in the field of counter-terrorism (T) or regarding strategies for 
addressing radicalisation (R), extremism (E), or jihadism (J). Table 3 
provides a summary of evaluations for each country with regard to these four 
areas. The next two columns of table 3 indicate which ministry is currently 
responsible for this domain, and whether there is involvement of non-
governmental actors. The last column shows whether there is any 
coordination in the policy domain regarding approaches to dealing with 
jihadism, and if this is the case, by which actor. Together tables 2 and 3 
provide an overview of developments over time and the similarities and 
90 
 
differences between each country. These developments are briefly explained 
below. 
 In all investigated countries additional plans have been drawn up 
regarding counter-terrorism after the attacks on 11 September 2001. 
In many cases they have been made public, but not always. Belgium 
and Germany have plans, but they have not been made public. The 
same initially applied to the UK; however, the country made its 
strategy public in 2006. Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US have 
had public plans for a longer time. France presented a plan later, in 
2016, specifically in the field of counter-terrorism; 
 With the exception of the US, usually the justice or interior mini-
stries are primarily responsible for counter-terrorism. The American 
DHS, although comparable with an interior ministry, has a narrower 
horizon by focusing on domestic or ‘homeland’ security. But 
attaching more prominence to security is seen elsewhere as well: in 
the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice has increased its profile as a 
security actor by changing its name to Ministry of Security and 
Justice; 
 Nowadays all countries regard the strategies for addressing radicali-
sation or extremism as a policy field with its own distinct character 
which requires different knowledge and expertise than counter-
terrorism; 
 The terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ are not clearly delinea-
ted. Only the UK and the Netherlands make a distinction between 
both terms. The UK is the only country which not only has an appro-
ach for dealing with radicalisation through the Prevent strategy, but 
also recently introduced its own strategy for tackling extremism; 
 In all countries non-governmental actors are involved in the policy 
field, but to very different extents. In the UK, the US, Germany, and 
the Netherlands, these actors are actively involved, both in drawing 
up and implementing the plans. Denmark is cautious and France is 
hesitant in involving religious institutions because of the strict 
separation of church and state; 
 In all countries there is a coordination of policies with regard to 
dealing with jihadism. The most common form is coordination 
between the police and intelligence and security services. The 
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Netherlands is the only country which coordinates counter-terrorism 
and radicalisation across the full scope of the field. 
Below these general observations will be explained in greater depth. 
17.2  Reflection 
17.2.1  Increasing visibility of the policy domain 
The fact that counter-terrorism – particularly focusing on jihadism – and 
counter-radicalisation have become prominent policy fields seems hardly a 
surprising conclusion. More notable are the differences in openness regar-
ding the various policies. Part One showed that there are large differences 
between the countries. Germany has a counter-terrorism strategy, but it has 
not been made public, similarly to Belgium’s Plan R, although the revised 
version was eventually made public in June 2016. Other countries, such as 
the Netherlands, have produced various policy documents which are the 
subject of political and public debate. 
There are several reasons why it is worthwhile to mention the visibility 
aspect of policies dealing with jihadism. First, public action plans and strate-
gies provide the public with insight into the vision adopted and measures 
taken. This connects to issues of transparency, legitimation and evaluation of 
public actions. Second, action plans and strategies serve as a means of 
communication intended to inform other government bodies or citizens 
about both threats to society and the possible solutions crafted by the 
government. Third, public action plans and strategies create political and 
social expectations about security, what Beatrice de Graaf refers to as the 
performative power of counter-terrorism policy.
1
  
The Dutch counter-terrorism strategies from 2011 and 2016 recognise the 
relationship between policy and the intensity and nature of social perceptions 
of terrorism.
2
 It can be stated that informing citizens to reassure them is 
inextricably related to a certain degree of alarm about the threat. In relation 
to the visibility and public nature of the policy domain, this means that more 
information does not always result in better informed or reassured citizens. 
When we compare the countries, we see that most countries in recent years 
have taken their policies more into the public domain and their citizens have 
                                                          
1 De Graaf 2010. 
2 Rijksoverheid 2011, p. 74; Rijksoverheid 2016, p. 8. 
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become more informed about policies conducted, but this does not necessar-
ily mean that they are less afraid. 
17.2.2  An increase in policy coordination and information sharing 
In all countries examined, new initiatives have been taken in recent years to 
improve national coordination and exchange of information, in particular 
between the intelligence and security services. The need for this can be 
traced to the blurring of the boundaries between national and international 
security, an insight which can also be found in policy documents.
3
 An 
absolute separation of responsibilities, whereby security services and police 
are responsible for dealing with domestic threats, while intelligence services 
and defence are responsible for foreign threats, has been regarded as insuf-
ficient since the 1990s. 
Especially in view of the emergence of counter-radicalisation policies, and 
thus the broadening scope of policies dealing with jihadism, the coordination 
of policy will likely become more important. What makes this even more 
complex is the fact that partners outside the ‘classic’ security domain are 
increasingly involved in dealing with jihadism. As a result, policy has 
become more comprehensive, which can be seen both on a declaratory level 
and in practice. Two developments play a role here. 
First of all, we may observe changing roles: the social domain is moving 
closer to the work of security professionals due to counter-radicalisation 
policies, while intelligence and security services have become more con-
nected to actors in the social domain. The UK and Denmark are illustrative 
in this respect. Particularly in the UK, but also in Denmark, schools and 
social organisations are asked to contribute ideas and to counter radicali-
sation. At the same time, the Danish PET tries to counter radicalisation at an 
early stage through the Centre for Prevention. The multidisciplinary consul-
tative structures on a local level in the Netherlands and Denmark are 
manifestations of the increasing role of the police in the social domain.  
A second development is the increase in public-private cooperation. This 
cooperation is not equally developed in all countries. However, it has greatly 
expanded in the UK, the US, and Germany.
4
 Denmark is cautious in this 
                                                          
3 Anderson et. al. 1995; Bigo 2000. 
4 This is mainly related to the idea that the government should play a cautious role in regulating society, 
and therefore intentionally leaves many tasks to the private sector. 
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respect. Danish authorities are more sceptical about working with a sector 
characterised by profit incentives – at least when it comes to counter-radi-
calisation. A similar consideration relates to cooperation between govern-
ment bodies and non-profit organisations and (religious) communities. To 
what extent can or do these non-governmental actors want to play a role with 
regard to dealing with jihadism, and what effects does this have on their 
functioning and place in society? These developments and accompanying 
questions and considerations make policy coordination and information shar-
ing one of the most difficult aspects related to dealing with jihadism. 
17.2.3  The increasing focus on radicalisation  
The most distinctive element of dealing with jihadism in the past decade is 
the growth of policy aimed at identifying (potential) violent perpetrators at 
the earliest possible stages, through so-called soft policy (dialogue, 
coaching, and mentorship). When we compare the seven countries, in gener-
al two approaches can be identified. The UK and US, in particular, emphas-
ise counter-radicalisation primarily as an ideological effort, whereby the 
narratives of jihadist ideology must be refuted. In contrast, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, and Belgium focus more on social and environmental 
factors. Until recently, French policy tended toward the first approach, but 




There are also new and diverse developments regarding the scope of the 
intervention domain. Policy plans for counter-radicalisation in the UK, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands initially focused heavily on promoting the 
integration of minorities. An oft-heard criticism was that this would stigmat-
ise entire population groups and create suspect communities. Later versions 
of these plans broke with such a focus, and moved more towards specific 
interventions. As concerns future developments, the question remains where 
the boundaries are for policies on jihadism. Because developments concern-
ing how to deal with jihadism are closely related to the observed level of 
threat, political and social discussions concerning (national) security, and 
availability of resources, it is not possible to give a conclusive prediction in 
this respect. 
                                                          
5 These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
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17.3  Continuation 
This report shows the main features of how seven countries deal with 
jihadism by focusing on their counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation 
plans and policies. For this purpose we examined plans and strategies and 
the actors involved, and distinguished three major developments. In the next 
reports we will specify and expound upon a number of subareas. We will 
discuss in particular issues that hold a prominent place on the security agen-
da: person-specific measures with regard to those travelling to and returning 





18  Dilemmas 
On the basis of this report a number of dilemmas can be identified. 
Formulation 
 There is a difference in terminology between the countries in terms 
of identifying the issues relevant for counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalisation. Table 1 on page 17 shows this with regard to Syria/ 
Iraq travellers. What is referred to as ‘jihadism’ in the Netherlands is 
called ‘Islamistischer Terrorismus’ in Germany and ‘militant Islam-
isme’ in Denmark. While the term Countering Violent Extremism is 
used in the US, it is called ‘confronting radicalisation’ in the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Germany, and France, while the notions of extrem-
ism and radicalisation are combined in Denmark. The struggle about 
terminology is a manifestation of how to get to grips and thus make 
sense of the threats and risks counter-terrorism and counter-radicali-
sation deal with. 
 Programmes for countering radicalisation have received much critic-
ism, in particular in the UK and US, for contributing to the stigmati-
sation of Muslim communities as allegedly important places of radi-
calisation and risk of terrorism. For instance, the name of the 
Mosque Plan, which was announced in Belgium in 2002, was per-
haps not the most sensible choice. The 2015 British Counter-
Extremism Strategy also refers regularly to examples of Islamist 
extremism, amongst others, to legitimise the need for a strategy. In 
light of this, and building on the preceding bullet point, the question 
is when certain terms or ways of framing turn into stereotyping or 
even stigmatising. 
Comparability 
 In the US and Germany there are programmes for those leaving 
jihadist groups and undergoing de-radicalisation based on previous 
experiences with gangs or right-wing extremism. Such initiatives 
may explain how persons can be removed from certain (politically) 
violent environments. However, it can be questioned to what extent 
the dynamics and needs in the case of jihadism are the same as with 
gangs and right-wing extremism. Are these two phenomena actually 
the most relevant examples for obtaining knowledge about dealing 
with jihadism? In other words, with which other problems may 




 The way in which counter-terrorism policy is evaluated varies per 
country, a summary of which may be found in Table 3 on pages 100-
101. Are the evaluations carried out by the ministries who are also 
responsible for the policy, or are they undertaken by external actors? 
What is examined as part of these studies? Does it concern indivi-
dual measures, the effects of the policies, the consistency of all 
measures, the statutory framework, or the implementation of the 
measures? The question also arises whether these evaluations must 
be made public for the purposes of democratic accountability. 
 A large number of different actors are involved in counter-radicali-
sation. From the viewpoint of democratic accountability, the ques-
tion is how the commercial and non-profit sectors and communities 
should relate to this. Can and should these non-governmental actors 
be assessed regarding their efforts and results? If so, how? 
Scope of the policy domain 
 All countries apply a variant of what is referred to as the broad 
approach in the Netherlands. Beside investigation and prosecution, 
there is also a focus on the early identification of processes that may 
lead to political violence. Traditional actors such as the police, judi-
cial authorities, and the intelligence and security services have 
responsibilities here, but increasingly so do socially-oriented govern-
ment actors, non-governmental organisations both with and without 
a profit incentive, as well as communities. This may be called an 
integrated approach, but the question is whether such an approach is 
at odds with providing the policy domain with a clear focus. Is an 
integrated approach a conscious choice, the result of a lack of choice 
or perhaps indecisiveness? Who actually supervises this broad field? 
Role of non-governmental organisations and communities 
 On what basis should non-profit organisations be involved in deal-
ing with radicalisation? Do these organisations only qualify for 
government subsidies when they focus on developing activities as 
part of counter-radicalisation efforts? 
 Communities are regarded as an important player in preventing 
radicalisation, because it is thought that they are relatively close to 
individuals at risk of radicalisation, and can therefore identify early 
signals more adequately. The question is how these communities 
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should be contacted. It is also important to consider to what extent 
organisations are involved that have many ideological similarities 
with those persons who (may) want to take the step to use violence. 
Where should the line be drawn? How should minorities within less 
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CT  Counter-terrorism 
CVE  Countering violent extremism 
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US) 
E  Extremism 
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Gov’t Government 
J  Jihadism 
Jus  Ministry of Justice 
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MoI  Ministry of the Interior 
N/A  Not applicable 
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